K. E. VOROSHILOV

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STALIN
AND THE RED ARMY

THE PERIOD of peaceful construction in the history of our country is replete with events of tremendous importance. Rivers and oceans of water have flowed under the bridges in recent years. Great changes have taken place all around us, our perspectives are rather different from what they were, and accepted ideas of volume and scale have been completely upset. Inseparably linked up with all these events is the teeming and manifold revolutionary activity of Comrade Stalin. During the last five or

six years Comrade Stalin has been in the centre of the developing and surging struggle for the Party, for Socialism. Only these circumstances can explain why the role of Comrade Stalin as one of the most outstanding organizers of the victories of the Civil War has to some extent been kept in the shade by these events and has not yet received due appreciation.

Today, on our friend's fiftieth birthday, I should like partially, at least, to make good this omission.*

Needless to say, in a newspaper article I can hardly claim to give a full account of Comrade Stalin's military work. I shall merely try to call to comrades' minds some facts from the recent past, and publish certain little-known documents, thus using the plain testimony of facts to show the truly remarkable role played by Comrade Stalin at tense moments during the Civil War.

In the period from 1918 to 1920 Comrade Stalin was probably the only person whom the Central Committee shifted about from battle front to battle front, selecting the most vulner-

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* The present article was written by Comrade Voroshilov on the occasion of Comrade Stalin's fiftieth birthday.—*Ed.*

able spots, the places where the threat to the revolution was most imminent. Stalin was never to be found where things were comparatively quiet and going smoothly, where success was attending our arms. But wherever, for various reasons, the Red Army suffered reverses, wherever the counterrevolutionary forces, pressing their successes, threatened the very existence of Soviet power, wherever alarm and panic might at any moment develop into helplessness and catastrophe—there Comrade Stalin was always sure to appear. Foregoing sleep, he organized the masses of the Party members and of the workers, the Red Army commanders and their men; he took the reins of leadership into his own firm hands and broke down the confused state of mind. He was merciless not only to enemies but also to panicmongers and saboteurs; he crushed conspiracies both in the rear and at the front, created a healthier atmosphere, achieved the necessary change and constantly worked for the victory of the Red Army. Comrade Stalin himself wrote of this in one of his letters to the Central Committee in 1919, saying that he was being "turned into a specialist for cleaning out the stables of the Department for Military Affairs."

TSARITSYN

Comrade Stalin began his career as a military man on the Tsaritsyn Front. At the beginning of June 1918 Comrade Stalin together with a detachment of Red Army men and two armoured cars left for Tsaritsyn in the capacity of director of food supplies in South Russia. In Tsaritsyn he encountered incredible chaos in Soviet, trade union and Party organizations but the confusion and muddle in the various departments at military headquarters was even worse. At every step Comrade Stalin ran into obstacles, arising from the general situation, which interfered with the performance of his immediate task. These obstacles were mainly a result of the rapidly growing Cossack counter-revolution, extensively supported at that time by the German army of occupation which had invaded the Ukraine. Counterrevolutionary Cossack bands quickly seized a number of points near Tsaritsyn and thereby not only made it impossible to organize regular procurements of grain for starving Moscow and Petrograd, but also placed Tsaritsyn in extreme danger.

Things, at the time, were equally bad in other places. In Moscow there was the uprising

of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. In the East, Muravyov had turned traitor; in the Urals, the Czechoslovakian counterrevolutionary revolt was developing; in the far South the English were closing in on Baku. The whole country was in a ring of fire. The revolution was experiencing its severest trials. Telegram after telegram flashed over the wires between Moscow and Tsaritsyn, between Lenin and Stalin. Lenin warned of dangers, offered encouragement, called for decisive measures. The fate of Tsaritsyn acquired paramount importance. An uprising on the Don and the loss of Tsaritsyn would involve the loss of the entire rich North Caucasian granary and the Baku oil fields, and would permit the Whites to effect a union between the Don counterrevolutionaries, Kolchak and the Czechoslovak counterrevolutionaries and then to march jointly upon Moscow. Tsaritsyn had to be held at any price. Comrade Stalin thoroughly understood this. As an experienced revolutionary, he was soon convinced that his work would be of no avail unless he could influence the military command, which played the decisive role under these conditions.

"The railway south of Tsaritsyn has not yet been restored," he wrote to Lenin in a

memorandum of July 7, that was transmitted with the characteristic superscription: "I am rushing off to the front, am writing only on business."

"I am driving and bawling out everyone who needs it. We hope to restore the line shortly. You may rest assured that we will spare nobody, neither ourselves nor others, and that we shall deliver the grain in spite of everything. If our military 'experts' (bunglers!) had not been loafing on the job the line would not have been cut. And if the line is restored it will not be because of them but in spite of them."*

And further on, replying to Lenin's apprehensions as to the possibility of action by the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in Tsaritsyn, he writes briefly, but forcefully and plainly:

"As to the hysterical ones, rest assured that our hand will not falter. We shall treat enemies as enemies."**

The more he examined the military apparatus, the more Comrade Stalin became con-

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* J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. 4, p. 118.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, p. 492.

vinced of its complete helplessness and, in some sections, even of its direct reluctance to organize resistance to the counterrevolution that was raising its insolent head.

And on July 11, 1918, Comrade Stalin wired to Lenin:

"Matters are complicated by the fact that the Military Headquarters of the North Caucasus Area has proved to be utterly incapable of adapting itself to the requirements of combating counterrevolution. The fact is that our 'experts' are not only psychologically incapable of ruthlessly combating the counterrevolution, but likewise, being 'staff' workers, who only know how to make 'field sketches' and draft plans for realignment, are absolutely indifferent to actual operations . . . and, in general, regard themselves as outsiders, as guests. The military commissars have been unable to save the situation. . . ."

Comrade Stalin did not confine himself to this devastating characterization; in the same memorandum he drew his own practical conclusion:

"I consider that I have no right to regard matters with indifference when the section of the front held by Kalnin is cut off from the

supply base, and the North is cut off from the grain districts; I shall correct these and many other shortcomings on the spot; I am taking a number of measures—even to the point of removing the officials and commanders who ruin matters—and shall continue to do so, in spite of formal difficulties, which I shall brush aside when necessary. It is understood that I assume full responsibility before all higher bodies."

The situation became more and more critical. Comrade Stalin worked with tremendous energy, and in an exceedingly short time from Commissar-General of food supplies he became the actual leader of all the Red forces on the Tsaritsyn Front. This state of affairs received official recognition in Moscow, and Comrade Stalin was charged with

"... establishing order, consolidating the detachments into regular units and establishing a proper command, at the same time dismissing all insubordinates." (From the telegram of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, with the superscription: "The present telegram is sent with Lenin's approval.")

It was at this time that the remnants of the Ukrainian revolutionary army reached Tsari-

tsyn, having retreated across the Don steppe under pressure of the German forces.

A Revolutionary Military Council was formed, with Comrade Stalin at its head, which undertook the organization of a regular army. The dynamic spirit of Comrade Stalin, his energy and will, accomplished what had seemed impossible only yesterday. In a minimum of time divisions, brigades and regiments sprang into being. The headquarters, the commissary and ordnance departments, and the entire rear were thoroughly purged of counterrevolutionary and hostile elements. The Soviet and Party apparatus was improved and began to function more efficiently. A group of old Bolsheviks and revolutionary workers rallied around Comrade Stalin, and in place of the helpless staff a Red, Bolshevik stronghold grew up in the South at the gates of the counterrevolutionary Don.

At that time Tsaritsyn was full of counterrevolutionaries of every possible hue, from Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and terrorists to rabid monarchists. Before Comrade Stalin appeared on the scene and before the arrival of the revolutionary detachments from the Ukraine all these gentry had felt almost at ease

and had lived in anticipation of better days. The reorganization of the Red forces at the front necessitated a ruthless purge of the rear, administered with an iron hand. The Revolutionary Military Council headed by Comrade Stalin set up a special Cheka and commissioned it to purge Tsaritsyn of counterrevolution.

The testimony of an enemy is sometimes valuable and interesting. This is how Colonel Nosovich (former Chief of Operations of the army), who had betrayed us and deserted to the Krassnov forces, describes this period and the part played by Comrade Stalin, in the White-guard paper *Donskaya Volna* of February 3, 1919:

"Stalin's chief commission was to furnish food supplies for the northern provinces, and he wielded unlimited authority in the performance of this task....

"The Gryazi-Tsaritsyn line had been completely cut. In the North there was only one means left of receiving supplies and maintaining communications: the Volga. In the South, after the Volunteer Army had occupied Tikhoretskaya, the situation also became extremely precarious. For Stalin, who obtained his supplies exclusively from the Stavropol province,

this situation virtually spelled the end of his mission in the South. But evidently it goes against the grain of a man like Stalin to give up a job once he has undertaken it. In justice to him it must be admitted that any of the old administrators might well envy his energy, and his ability to adapt himself to circumstances and to the business in hand might well serve as a model to many.

"Gradually, as he was left with nothing to do, or rather, as his direct task diminished, Stalin began to go into all phases of the city's administration, and particularly into the comprehensive task covering the Tsaritsyn defence and the whole Caucasian so-called revolutionary front in general."

Further on, describing the situation in Tsaritsyn, Nosovich writes:

"By this time the situation in Tsaritsyn, in general, had become very ominous. The Tsaritsyn Cheka worked full speed. Not a single day passed without various plots being unearthed in what had seemed the most trustworthy and secret places. All the city prisons were overcrowded....

"The fighting at the front became extremely intense....

"The supreme motive force and supreme authority after July 20 was Stalin. A simple conversation with Moscow over the direct wire on the inconvenience and unsuitability of the existing system of administration of the district resulted in Moscow's issuing an order over the wire which placed Stalin in charge of all military ... and civil affairs...."

But Nosovich himself further acknowledges how well founded were the measures of repression. Here is what he writes regarding the counterrevolutionary organizations in Tsaritsyn:

"By this time the local counterrevolutionary organization, which supported the political platform of the Constituent Assembly, was also considerably strengthened, and, having received funds from Moscow, was preparing to take active steps in support of the Don Cossacks in the work of liberating Tsaritsyn.

"Most unfortunately, the head of this organization, the engineer Alexeyev, and his two sons, who all came from Moscow, were ill-acquainted with the actual situation, and the organization was discovered because of a fallacious plan which hinged on the active

participation of a Serbian battalion in the service of the Bolsheviks and attached to the Cheka....

"Stalin's order was brief: 'Shoot them!' The engineer Alexeyev, his two sons, and together with them a goodly number of officers, some of whom belonged to the organization while others were merely suspected of being accomplices, were seized by the Cheka and immediately shot without trial."

Touching further on the subject of how the rear (the military headquarters of the North Caucasus Area and its departments) was smashed and purged of Whiteguards, Nosovich writes:

"The characteristic feature of this drive was Stalin's attitude towards telegraphic orders from the centre. When Trotsky, disturbed at the destruction of the area administrative apparatus which he had taken such pains to create, sent a telegram to the effect that the staff and commissariat must be left as they were and that facilities be given them to go on with their work, Stalin wrote a superscription on this telegram which was as categorical as it was significant:

" 'Disregard.'

"And so this telegram was disregarded, and the entire Ordnance Department and a section of the headquarters staff remain under arrest on a barge in Tsaritsyn."

In a short while Tsaritsyn became utterly unrecognizable. A city where till recently music had played in the parks, where the bourgeoisie who had fled here openly thronged the streets in company with White officers, was transformed into a Red military camp, where without exception the strictest order and military discipline prevailed. This strengthening of the rear immediately had a good effect on the morale of our regiments fighting at the front. The commanding and political personnel and the entire rank and file of the Red Army began to feel that they were being directed by a firm revolutionary hand which was fighting for the interests of the workers and peasants, meting out merciless retribution to all who stood in the way of this struggle.

Comrade Stalin's leadership was not confined to his office. When the necessary order had been established and organization restored on a revolutionary basis, he left for the front, which at the time was strung out for over 600 kilometres. And only a Stalin, a man of his su-

perb ability and inherent genius, could have grasped in all their details the special military problems of the extremely difficult situation at the time without having had any previous military training.

I remember the beginning of August 1918 as though it were yesterday. The Krassnov Cossack units were attacking Tsaritsyn, hoping by a concentric blow to throw the Red regiments back to the Volga. For many days the Red troops, with the Communist division, which was entirely composed of workers from the Donets Basin, in the van, withstood the powerful onslaught of the splendidly organized Cossack units. It was an extremely tense moment. One should have seen Comrade Stalin then. He was as calm and contemplative as ever. He went without sleep literally for days on end, his intense activities divided between front-line operations and army headquarters. The situation at the front became almost catastrophic. By a well-planned manoeuvre the Krassnov units under the command of Fitzkhalaurov, Mamontov and others were pressing our harassed troops, which sustained terrific losses. Shaped like a horseshoe with its flanks reaching to the Volga, the enemy's front contracted from day to day. We

had no means of retreat, but Stalin did not worry about that. He was filled with one concern, with one single thought—to achieve victory and destroy the enemy at all costs. And Stalin's indomitable will to victory spread to all his closest comrades-in-arms, and in spite of the almost hopeless situation no one doubted that victory would be ours.

And we did achieve victory, did keep Tsaritsyn. The enemy was crushed and flung far back towards the Don.

PERM

At the end of 1918 a catastrophic situation arose on the Eastern Front, especially on the sector held by the Third Army, which was compelled to surrender Perm. Caught in a semicircle by the enemy, this army was completely demoralized by the end of November. Six months of unrelieved fighting with no reliable reserves to speak of, an insecure rear and utter disorganization of food supplies (the Twenty-Ninth Division repelled the enemy's attacks for five days literally without a crust of bread), thirty-five degrees below zero weather coupled

with the complete absence of negotiable roads, a tremendously long and straggling front (more than 400 kilometres), and an incompetent staff had incapacitated the Third Army from withstanding the onslaught of the superior forces of the enemy.

To complete the discouraging picture there must be added wholesale treason by the commanding staff, composed of former tsarist officers, and the surrender of entire regiments, a result of the poor class selection of the replacements, and utterly incompetent commanders. Under these conditions the Third Army had completely collapsed, and was retreating in disorder. In twenty days it had fallen back 300 kilometres, losing 18,000 men, scores of field guns, hundreds of machine guns, etc. The enemy was making rapid headway, creating a real threat to Vyatka and to the entire Eastern Front.

These events made it imperative for the Central Committee to ascertain the causes of the catastrophe and immediately restore order among the units of the Third Army so as to improve the state of affairs near Perm. Who should be sent to carry out this extremely difficult task? Lenin wired to

the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic:

"A number of communications have been received from Party organizations around Perm reporting the catastrophic condition of the army, and drunkenness. I thought of sending Stalin. I am afraid Smilga will be lenient with . . . , who, it is said, also drinks and is incapable of restoring order."

The Central Committee adopted the following decision:

"To appoint a Party investigating commission consisting of Dzerzhinsky and Stalin, members of the Central Committee, for the purpose of thoroughly investigating the causes of the surrender of Perm and the recent defeats on the Ural Front, and of fully ascertaining all the attendant circumstances. The Central Committee authorizes the commission to take all measures necessary to effect the rapid restoration of both Party and Soviet work in the entire district of the Third and Second Armies." (*Sverdlov's telegram No. 00079.*)

This decision seemingly limited the functions of Comrades Stalin and Dzerzhinsky to "investigating the causes of the surrender of Perm and the recent defeats on the Ural

Front." But Comrade Stalin concentrated attention, in his "Party investigation" work, on the taking of effective measures to remedy the situation, consolidate the front, etc. In the very first telegram to Lenin, dated January 5, 1919, on the results of the commission's work, Stalin does not say a single word about "the causes of the catastrophe," but promptly poses the question of what must be done to save the army. Here is the telegram:

"Comrade Lenin, Chairman of the Council of Defence,

"Investigation begun. Shall report incidentally on progress made. Meanwhile we consider it necessary to inform you of one urgent need of the Third Army. Of the Third Army (over 30,000 men) there remain only about 11,000 weary and battered soldiers, who can barely withstand the onslaught of the enemy. The units despatched by the Commander-in-Chief are unreliable, in part even hostile to us, and require a thorough sifting. In order to save the remnants of the Third Army and prevent a rapid advance of the enemy to Vyatka (according to all reports from the commanding staff of the front and the Third Army, this is a very real danger) it is *absolutely* essential to *rush*

at least three *thoroughly* reliable regiments from Russia and place them at the disposal of the army commander. We urgently request you to exert pressure on the appropriate military bodies to this end. We repeat that unless such measures are taken Vyatka is threatened with the fate of Perm. Such is the general opinion of the comrades concerned, and all the facts at our disposal lead us to endorse it.

"STALIN

"F. DZERZHINSKY

"January 5, 1919, Vyatka.
*"8 P.M."**

And only on January 13, 1919, did Comrade Stalin together with Comrade Dzerzhinsky send to V. I. Lenin and the Central Committee of the Party their "Brief Preliminary Report" on the progress of the investigation into the causes of the Perm catastrophe, which may be summarized as follows: exhaustion and weariness of the army when the enemy launched its offensive; our lack of reserves at that time; isolation of the staff headquarters from the army;

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* J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. 4, pp. 186-89.

mismanagement on the part of the army commander; downright criminal methods of directing operations at the front on the part of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which paralyzed the front with its contradictory orders and made it utterly impossible for the latter to come to the prompt aid of the Third Army; unreliability of the reinforcements sent up from the rear, to be explained by the use of the old methods of recruiting; and complete instability of the rear, to be explained by the utter helplessness and incompetence of the local Soviet and Party organizations.

At the same time Comrade Stalin drew up, and immediately carried out with his customary promptness and firmness, a whole series of practical measures for improving the fighting efficiency of the Third Army.

"By January 15," we read in the report of the Commission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence to Comrade Lenin, "a force of 1,200 men, reliable infantry and cavalry, were sent to the front; two days later two squadrons of cavalry were despatched. On the 20th, the Sixty-Second Regiment of the Third Brigade (having first been carefully sifted) was despatched. These

units made it possible to check the enemy's advance, completely changed the morale of the Third Army, and began our offensive on Perm, which is so far proceeding successfully. . . .

"Behind the lines a thorough purging of Soviet and Party institutions is going on. Revolutionary committees have been organized in Vyatka and in the county towns. A start has been made to set up strong revolutionary organizations in the villages; this work is being continued. All Party and Soviet work is being put on a new footing. The military control bodies have been purged and reorganized. The provincial Cheka has been sifted and reinforced with new Party workers. The congestion on the Vyatka railway line is being alleviated . . ."* and so forth.

As a result of all these measures not only was the enemy's further advance checked, but in January 1919 the Eastern Front launched an offensive and on our right flank Uralsk was taken.

This is how Comrade Stalin understood and carried out his task of "investigating the causes

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 222-23.

of the catastrophe." He investigated and established these causes and, right there and then, by his own efforts, eliminated them and achieved the necessary turn of the tide.

PETROGRAD

In the spring of 1919 the Whiteguard army of General Yudenich, carrying out the task set by Kolchak of "seizing Petrograd" and diverting the revolutionary forces from the Eastern Front, with the help of Estonian and Finnish White troops and the British fleet, suddenly took the offensive and placed Petrograd in immediate danger. The seriousness of the situation was further accentuated by the fact that in Petrograd itself counterrevolutionary plots were discovered, the leaders of which turned out to be military experts serving in the staff headquarters of the Western Front, in the Seventh Army and the Kronstadt naval base. While Yudenich advanced on Petrograd, Bulak-Balakhovich scored a number of successes in the direction of Pskov. Treason raised its head at the front. Several of our regiments went over to the side of the enemy; the entire garrisons

of Fort Krassnaya Gorka and Fort Seraya Loshad came out openly against Soviet power. Dismay seized the entire Seventh Army. The front began to waver; the enemy was nearing Petrograd. The situation had to be remedied immediately.

The Central Committee again chose Comrade Stalin for the job. In the space of three weeks Comrade Stalin succeeded in effecting a radical change for the better. Laxity and consternation among the troops were soon eliminated. The staffs were whipped into shape; mobilizations of Petrograd workers and Communists were carried through in rapid succession; enemies and traitors were mercilessly destroyed. Comrade Stalin intervened in the field operations of the military command. Here is what he telegraphed to Comrade Lenin:

"Following the capture of Fort Krassnaya Gorka, Fort Seraya Loshad has been taken. Their guns are in perfect order; a rapid checking up on all forts and strongholds is under way.

"The naval experts assert that the capture of Krassnaya Gorka from the sea runs counter to all naval science. I can only deplore this so-called science. The swift capture of Gorka was due to the grossest interference in the oper-

ations by me and by civilians generally, even to the point of countermanding orders on land and sea and imposing our own.

"I consider it my duty to declare that I shall continue to act in this way in future, despite all my reverence for science.

"STALIN

"*June 16, 1919.*"*

Within six days Comrade Stalin reported to Lenin:

"A change for the better has begun among our troops. For a week we have not had a single case of individual or group desertion to the enemy. Deserters are returning in thousands. Desertions to us from the enemy camp have become more frequent. In one week some 400 men have come over to us, most of them armed. Our offensive began yesterday afternoon. Although promised reserves have not yet come up, to have remained any further at the line at which we had stopped was out of the question—we were too near Petrograd. So far the offensive is developing successfully. The Whites are on the run. The line occupied today

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* *Ibid.*, p. 261.

stretches from Kernovo via Voronino and Slepino to Kaskovo. We have taken prisoners and captured two or more field pieces, automatic rifles, cartridges. Enemy vessels have not shown up; evidently they are afraid of Krassnaya Gorka, which is now entirely ours. Urgently despatch two million rounds of cartridges to me for the Sixth Division. . . ."

These two telegrams give a clear picture of the tremendous creative work done by Comrade Stalin in remedying the extremely dangerous situation that had arisen near Red Petrograd. The iron will and supreme perspicacity of Comrade Stalin aided the Soviet troops and the workers of Petrograd in their successful defence of the city against the invaders. Yudenich's army was defeated and the Entente's scheme to seize Petrograd foiled.

THE SOUTHERN FRONT

Everyone remembers the autumn of 1919. The crucial moment of the whole Civil War was at hand. The Whiteguard hordes under the command of Denikin, equipped by the "Allies" and assisted by their general staffs, were ap-

proaching Orel. The whole vast Southern Front was slowly falling back. The internal situation was equally grave. Food difficulties had become extremely acute. Industry was at a standstill for lack of fuel. Inside the country and even in Moscow itself counterrevolutionary elements were beginning to bestir themselves. Tula was in danger, Moscow was threatened.

The situation had to be saved, and the Central Committee sent Comrade Stalin to the Southern Front in the capacity of a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. There is now no need to hide the fact that prior to his appointment Comrade Stalin submitted three main conditions to the Central Committee: 1) that Trotsky does not interfere in the affairs of the Southern Front or cross its lines of demarcation; 2) that a number of people whom Comrade Stalin regarded as incapable of coping with the situation in the army be immediately recalled from the Southern Front; and 3) that new people selected by Stalin and capable of coping with this task be immediately despatched to the Southern Front. These conditions were fully accepted.

But it required a precise strategic plan and a clearly formulated objective to operate the

huge machine (extending from the Volga to the Polish-Ukrainian border) known as the Southern Front, which comprised several hundred thousand troops. This objective could then be placed before the troops, and by regrouping the army and concentrating the best forces at the main points a blow could be dealt to the enemy.

Comrade Stalin encountered a most uncertain and precarious situation at the front. On the main sector, the Kursk-Orel-Tula line, we were suffering heavy reverses, while the eastern flank was helplessly marking time. As directives for strategic operations, the old (September) plan was submitted to him. This provided that the main attack be launched by the left flank, from Tsaritsyn towards Novorossiisk, across the Don steppe.

After acquainting himself with the situation Comrade Stalin immediately made a decision. He categorically rejected the old plan, formulated new proposals, and submitted them to Lenin in the following note, which speaks for itself. This note is so interesting, it so clearly displays Comrade Stalin's strategic talent, and is so characteristic of him because of the categorical manner in which the question is put, that we think it worth quoting in full:

"Comrade Lenin!

"Some two months ago the Commander-in-Chief did not object in principle to launching an attack from West to East through the Donets Basin as the main effort. If, after all, he hesitated to launch an attack in this direction, it was, he maintained, merely because of the 'heritage' he had received as a result of the retreat of the southern troops during the summer, namely, the haphazard disposition of the troops in the area of the present Southeastern Front, the rearrangement of which would involve a huge loss in time, and this would be to Denikin's advantage.... But now the situation has radically changed and, with it, the disposition of the troops. The Eighth Army (the main army on the old Southern Front) has changed its disposition on the Southern Front and directly faces the Donets Basin; Budyonny's cavalry corps (the other main force) has also changed its disposition on the Southern Front; and another factor has been added—the Latvian division, which within a month, after it has received reinforcements, will again become a formidable threat to Denikin.... What induces the Commander-in-Chief (General Headquarters) to persist in the old plan? Only stubborn-

ness, apparently, or, if you like, factionalism —factionalism of the most stupid kind and most dangerous to the Republic, fostered in the Commander-in-Chief by the bantam cock of a 'strategist' Gusev.... The other day the Commander-in-Chief gave directives to Shorin to advance from the Tsaritsyn district on Novorossiisk across the Don steppe, along a line which our aviators might find it convenient to fly, but which our infantry and artillery would find impossible to trek. It requires no proof to show that this harebrained (but proposed) advance amidst *hostile* surroundings, with *passable roads* totally *lacking*, threatens us with complete disaster. It is not hard to understand that, as recent experience has shown, this campaign against the Cossack villages can only serve to antagonize the Cossacks towards us and make them rally around Denikin in defence of their villages; it can only put Denikin in the light of a saviour of the Don; it can only create a Cossack army for Denikin; that is to say, it can only strengthen Denikin.

"It is therefore necessary right away, without loss of time, to alter the old plan, which experience has already discredited, and re-

place it by a plan according to which the main attack will be launched on Rostov—from the Voronezh district by way of Kharkov and the Donets Basin. Firstly, here we shall be in surroundings which are not hostile, but on the contrary sympathetic to us, a circumstance which will facilitate our advance. Secondly, we shall secure an extremely important railway system (that of the Donets Basin) and the main artery feeding Denikin's army—the Voronezh-Rostov line.... Thirdly, by this advance we will cut Denikin's army in two. One part, the Volunteer Army, we shall leave for Makhno to devour, while the other, the Cossack army, we shall threaten with an attack in the rear. Fourthly, we shall be in a position to set the Cossacks quarrelling with Denikin, who, if our advance is successful, will try to move the Cossack units to the West, to which the majority of the Cossacks will not agree.... Fifthly, we shall secure coal, while Denikin will be left without coal.

"This plan must be adopted without delay....

"Briefly: The old plan, which has already been discredited by events, should not be revived under any circumstances—that would

endanger the Republic and would be sure to improve Denikin's position. It must be replaced by another plan. Circumstances and conditions are not only ripe for, but imperatively dictate such a change. . . .

"Without this my work at the Southern Front will be pointless, criminal, and superfluous, which will give me the right, or rather, make it my duty, to go anywhere, even to the devil, only not to remain on the Southern Front.

"Yours,

"STALIN

*"Serpukhov, October 15, 1919."**

All comment on this document seems superfluous. Worthy of note is the way Stalin gauges the shortest line of operations. In civil war simple arithmetic is sometimes inadequate and often misleading. The Tsaritsyn-Novorossiisk route may prove to be much longer, because it leads through hostile territory inhabited by the class enemy. And, on the contrary, the route from Tula to Novorossiisk may prove to be much shorter, because it goes through working-class Kharkov and the colliery districts

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 275-77.

of the Donets Basin. The gauging of the direction to be taken reveals Comrade Stalin's principal qualities as a proletarian revolutionary, as a real strategist of civil war.

Stalin's plan was accepted by the Central Committee. Lenin himself wrote the order to the field headquarters immediately changing the directives that had become obsolete. The Southern Front launched its main attack in the direction of Kharkov-Rostov via the Donets Basin. The results are known. It was the turning point in the Civil War. Denikin's hordes were hurled back to the Black Sea. The Ukraine and North Caucasus were delivered from the Whiteguards. A great share of the credit for all this belongs to Comrade Stalin.

Another extremely important historic event on the Southern Front connected with the name of Comrade Stalin deserves attention. I have in mind the formation of the Mounted Army. This was the first attempt to combine cavalry divisions into so large a unit as an army. Stalin saw the power of massed cavalry in the Civil War. He concretely perceived its tremendous significance in decisive manoeuvres. The past, however, could provide no precedent for such an original experiment as the

placing of mounted armies in the field. Nor was there anything on this subject in scientific works, and therefore a proposal of this kind either failed to be understood or gave rise to opposition. But Comrade Stalin was not to be discouraged. Once he was sure of the expediency and correctness of his plans, he always carried them out, regardless of obstacles. On November 11 the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic received the following report from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front:

"To the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

"The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front at its meeting of the 11th inst. has resolved, in view of conditions prevailing at the present moment, to form a Mounted Army to consist of the First and Second Cavalry Corps and of one rifle brigade (a second brigade to be added subsequently).

"The Revolutionary Military Council of the Mounted Army to be composed as follows:

"Army Commander—Comrade BUDYONNY;
members—Comrades VOROSHILOV
and SHCHADENKO.

"*Refer*: Decision of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, dated November 11, 1919, No. 505/a.

"We request endorsement of the aforesaid decision."

The Mounted Army was formed in spite of Trotsky's active resistance. The initiative in its formation belongs to Comrade Stalin, who clearly realized the absolute necessity for such a body. The historic consequences of this step are well known to all.

Still another characteristic feature of Comrade Stalin's was clearly revealed on the Southern Front—his method of action by means of shock groups: choose the main line of attack, concentrate the best units at that point, and crush the enemy. In this, just as in choosing the direction of attack, he acquired great skill.

After Denikin's defeat Stalin's authority as a first-class organizer and military leader became indisputable. When in January 1920, near Rostov, as a result of gross mistakes on the part of the command of the front, a dangerous delay occurred in our advance, when danger again loomed large that the Whiteguards, having rallied, might bring our victory

to naught, the Central Committee sent Stalin the following telegram:

"In view of the necessity of establishing real unity in the command of the Caucasian Front, of strengthening the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Front and of the Commander of the Army, of utilizing local forces and supplies on a broad scale, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee considers it imperative that you be immediately included in the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front.... Report when you will leave for Rostov."

Comrade Stalin abided by this decision, although he was of the opinion that in view of the state of his health he should be allowed to remain where he was. Then again, he was extremely worried lest these continuous shifts should be misunderstood by local Party organizations, which would be inclined "to accuse me of irresponsibly jumping from one field of administration to another, since they are unaware of the decisions of the Central Committee."* The Central Committee agreed with Comrade Stalin, and Lenin telegraphed him on

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* Comrade Stalin's telegram of February 7, 1920.

February 10: "I have not lost hope that... everything may be straightened out without your being transferred."

When in the din of the war against the Polish Whiteguards Wrangel sallied forth from the Crimea and created a new and dangerous threat to the liberated Donbas and the entire South, the Central Committee, on August 2, 1920, adopted the following decision:

"In view of Wrangel's successes and the anxiety in the Kuban, the Wrangel front must be regarded as an absolutely independent front of tremendous significance and dealt with separately. Comrade Stalin is instructed to form a Revolutionary Military Council and concentrate all his efforts on the Wrangel front...."

The same day Lenin wrote to Stalin:

"The Political Bureau has just divided up the fronts so that you may occupy yourself exclusively with Wrangel...."

Comrade Stalin organized the new front and outlined a plan for the annihilation of Wrangel. Stalin's adamant will and brilliant strategy pervaded Frunze's plan of operations, and Wrangel was defeated.

In the campaign against the Polish Whiteguards Comrade Stalin was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front. The defeat of the Polish army, the deliverance of Kiev and the territory of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper, the advance far into Galicia and the organization of the famous raid of the First Mounted Army—the child of Stalin's military genius—were all largely the result of his able and skilful leadership.

The defeat of the Poles along the entire front in the Ukraine and the almost complete annihilation of the Third Polish Army near Kiev, the crushing blows at Berdichev and Zhitomir and the advance of the First Mounted Army in the direction of Rovno made it possible for our Western Front also to launch a general offensive. The subsequent operations on the Southwestern Front brought the Red troops to the very gates of Lvov. Only the setback which our troops received near Warsaw as a result of the treasonable orders issued by Trotsky and his followers at the General Headquarters of the Red Army halted the Mounted Army, which was preparing to attack Lvov and was only ten kilometres away from it.

However, this period is so rich in events and its historiography requires such ample documentation and careful analysis that it would take us far beyond the bounds of our article.

This brief description of Comrade Stalin's army work falls far short of an adequate characterization of even his principal qualities as a military leader and proletarian revolutionary. What is most striking is Comrade Stalin's ability rapidly to grasp the concrete situation and act accordingly. A merciless foe of laxity, indiscipline, and haphazard methods, Comrade Stalin never hesitated, when the interests of the revolution so demanded, to take upon himself the responsibility for extreme measures, for making a clean sweep of things. When the revolutionary situation required it, Comrade Stalin was ready to defy any regulation, to disregard all formal subordination.

Comrade Stalin was always an advocate of the strictest military discipline and centralization, on the absolute condition, however, of intelligent and consistent direction on the part of the higher military bodies. In the report referred to above of the Commission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence to Comrade Lenin, dated Janu-

ary 31, 1919, Comrade Stalin together with Dzerzhinsky wrote:

"The army cannot act as a self-contained, fully autonomous unit. In its operations it depends entirely on the armies adjacent to it, and first and foremost on the directives of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Other things being equal, the best fighting army may meet with disaster in case of faulty instructions from the centre and lack of effective contact with adjacent armies. It is necessary to establish on the fronts, and first of all on the Eastern Front, a system of strictly focussing the operations of the separate armies on the execution of a definite and seriously thought-out strategic directive. Arbitrariness or superficiality in defining directives, lack of serious consideration of all factors and the consequent rapid change of directives, not to mention the vagueness of the directives themselves, such as occurs in the practice of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, makes it impossible to direct the armies, results in loss of effort and time, and disorganizes the front."*

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* J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works,* Russ. ed., Vol. 4, pp. 212-13.

Comrade Stalin always insisted on personal responsibility for work assigned, and could not stomach "passing the buck."

Comrade Stalin devoted serious attention to the organization of supplies for the troops. He knew and understood what good food and warm clothes meant to the men. In Tsaritsyn, in Perm, and on the Southern Front he would stop at nothing to ensure the supply of the troops and thus make them more stalwart and strong.

Comrade Stalin embodies the best traits of an organizer of the proletarian class front. He paid special attention to the class composition of the army, making sure it really consisted of workers and peasants "who do not exploit the labour of others." He attached tremendous importance to political work in the army; on many occasions it was he who took the initiative in mobilizing Communists, for he considered it essential that a large proportion of them enter the ranks as ordinary combatants. Comrade Stalin was extremely exacting in the selection of military commissars. He sharply criticized the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars at the time for sending out "greenhorns."

"Military commissars," he wrote, "must be the leading spirits of military work, giving their lead to the experts."*

Comrade Stalin attached vast importance to the political state of affairs in the rear of the army. In the report of the Commission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Defence to Comrade Lenin, he, together with Dzerzhinsky, wrote:

"The sore spot of our armies is the instability of the rear, which is mainly to be explained by the neglect of Party work, the inability of the Soviets of Deputies to put the directives of the centre into practice, and the abnormal (almost isolated) position of the local Chekas."**

Comrade Stalin was exceptionally strict in his choice of people. Regardless of post and really "regardless of person," he ruthlessly removed incompetent experts, commissars, and Party and Soviet workers. At the same time, however, Comrade Stalin more than anyone else always backed up and defended those who in his opinion had proved worthy of the confidence accorded them by the Revolution. This

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* Telegram from Tsaritsyn, 1918.

** J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. 4, p. 216.

is how Comrade Stalin acted in relation to deserving Red commanders known to him personally. When in the beginning of 1920 one of the real proletarian heroes of the Civil War, Comrade Parkhomenko, subsequently commander of the Fourteenth Cavalry Division, who fell in the struggle with the Makhno bands, was through no fault of his own sentenced to the supreme penalty, Comrade Stalin, on learning of this, demanded his immediate and unconditional release. Many such and similar instances might be adduced. More than anyone else among the outstanding leaders, Comrade Stalin knew how to value people who had devoted their lives to the proletarian revolution; and the commanders knew this, as did all those who fought for our cause under his leadership.

Such was Comrade Stalin during the Civil War. Such he has remained through the subsequent years of the struggle for Socialism.

The Civil War required infinite sagacity and the exertion of tremendous strength, energy and will power on the part of Comrade Stalin. He gave himself wholeheartedly and unreservedly to his duties, but at the same time he

acquired tremendous experience for his later work.

During the Civil War Comrade Stalin displayed extraordinary ability as a revolutionary strategist under varied and complex conditions. He always correctly determined the line of the main attack, and by his masterly application of tactics suited to the circumstances he achieved the desired results. These qualities of proletarian strategist and tactician he has retained after the Civil War as well. These qualities of his are well known to the whole Party.

Invaluable was the service Comrade Stalin rendered to our Motherland when he divined just in time the plans of the enemy agents in our country as represented by the trotskyites, bukharinites, and other traitors, wreckers and emissaries of the bourgeoisie. These enemies of the people attempted to undermine the economic and military might of our country and create a situation favourable to the imperialists in the event of war. Comrade Stalin directed the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet people along the line of defeating their enemies, which was decisive in the question of successfully building Socialism and strengthening the defensive

capacity of the U.S.S.R. The discomfiture of the enemies of the people was equivalent to winning a major military engagement.

After the Civil War Comrade Stalin ceased to be formally a military man, but he never ceased to occupy himself profoundly with questions concerning the defence of the Soviet state. As during the Civil War in years gone by so now he has an excellent knowledge of the Red Army and is its closest and most cherished friend.



STALIN, BUILDER OF THE RED ARMY

TOGETHER with the Bolshevik Party, together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Red Army is today celebrating the sixtieth birthday of the great Stalin.*

Stalin is not only the embodiment of Bolshevism and Soviet power; his name stands for victorious Socialism, inspiring our people to deeds of heroism, to valour, to creative work;

* The present article was written by Comrade Voroshilov on the occasion of the sixtieth birthday of Comrade Stalin.—*Ed.*

his name stands for the hopes, ambitions and prospects of the working people throughout the world. The name of Stalin is an international symbol—a name that has become the banner of the struggle for the great ideals of humanity.

At the same time his name is a synonym for the Red Army. The armed defence of victorious Socialism, the development of the Red Army of the Soviet Union, its history, its strength and might, its solid, steeled ranks, its technical equipment and heroic cadres are all inseparably linked with the name of Stalin.

The history and growth of the armed forces of the Soviet state are inseparable from Stalin. One cannot speak or write of Stalin without speaking or writing of the heroic history and heroic battles of the Red Army, just as one cannot speak or write of the Red Army without speaking or writing of Stalin, who, in close collaboration with Lenin, wrought its pillars when it was still in process of formation.

That is why today, when our whole country, united in an outpouring of love and appreciation, is celebrating the anniversary of Comrade Stalin's birth, all the men, commanders, com-

missars, the entire political personnel—all who make up the Armed Forces of the Soviet state—greet our great Stalin with a feeling of profound gratitude and joy.

Many volumes will be written about Stalin, the creator of the Red Army, who inspired and organized its victories, the propounder of the laws of the strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution.

We, his contemporaries and companions-in-arms, can only provide some of the details of his vast and fruitful work in the military field.

As a Marxist, a Leninist, Stalin became a leading figure in the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia long before the first Russian Revolution, that of 1905. A genuine Marxist and Bolshevik, he already then fought with the ardour of a true Leninist for the practical application of one of the fundamental principles of the Bolshevik Party—the armed uprising. It was he, Stalin—the true Bolshevik, the Leninist, the future strategist of the proletarian revolution and organizer of its victories—who, in 1905, when the work of organizing workingmen's squads for the armed struggle against tsarism had only just begun, did not hesitate,

in face of furious opposition and resistance on the part of the Mensheviks, to declare:

"What revolution can be victorious without arms, and what revolutionary would say, 'Down with arms!'? The speaker who says this is probably a Tolstoyan, not a revolutionary, and, whoever he may be, he is an enemy of the revolution, of the people's freedom....

"What do we need in order to really win? We need three things: first—arms, second—arms. third—arms and arms again!"*

And in 1917, from the very first days of the bourgeois-democratic February Revolution, it was Stalin in whom Lenin had a remarkable organizer of the fighting forces of the proletariat and of the labouring peasantry.

With a firm hand and exceptional precision Stalin, together with Lenin, prepared the armed assault in October 1917, personally directing all the operations in the great revolution, despatching detachment after detachment to the points of the fighting mapped

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* From J. V. Stalin's speech at a meeting of workers in Nadzaladevi (Tiflis district) held on the occasion of the publication of the tsar's Manifesto of October 17, 1905. See L. Beria, *On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia*, p. 136.

out by Lenin, anticipating the manoeuvres of the class enemy, dealing crushing, mortal blows to the foe.

In the years of the Civil War, with the country in the grip of famine and destitution, with the class struggle at its highest pitch, with no material base or arms to speak of, with the working class of Russia in a state of terrible exhaustion and the counterrevolution at home enjoying wide support on the part of the world imperialist bourgeoisie, it was Comrade Stalin who, together with Lenin and as his right hand, succeeded, step by step and in the methodical way characteristic of him, in laying the foundations of and raising forces for the Red Army—the armed defence of Socialism.

The greatness of our Stalin's services during that heroic period of our history consists in the fact that, under his firm direction, an army, an organized fighting force, was built up in the very process of the struggle to attain victory. The struggle, which needed an organized armed force if it was to be won, was itself utilized by Stalin with an experienced hand as an organizing, constructive factor.

In the pages of the heroic history of our revolution that deal with the Civil War,

Stalin's name will be written in letters of gold as the name of the man who organized and built up the Armed Forces of victorious Socialism.

"Either we create a real worker and peasant army, a strictly disciplined regular army, and defend the Republic, or we do not do so, and in that event our cause will be lost,"* Stalin said at the Eighth Congress of our Party.

These words were uttered in March 1919—at a time when the raging counterrevolution had not yet reached its zenith, when the kolchaks, denikins and yudeniches, liberally supplied with funds by the imperialist bourgeoisie of Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan and other countries, were pressing onward with their hordes from East and West, South and North, closing in upon Moscow, the centre of the proletarian revolution and its heart.

Stalin's words contained both an appraisal of the state of the Red Army of that period, and an outline of what was to be done in order to create a real, disciplined Workers'

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* J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. 4, p. 250.

and Peasants' Red Army charged with the task of defeating the numerous forces of the counter-revolution led by the tsarist generals.

And we created such an army. We created it because Lenin together with Stalin personally took the lead in this task, so difficult at that time, and accomplished it by their titanic labours.

In the years of the Civil War it was Stalin's indomitable will, Stalin's firm hand, strong as steel, his extraordinary self-possession and resoluteness in face of any conditions, his strictness with regard to himself and to others, coupled with exceptional solicitude for people, that inspired the men, commanders, commissars and the political personnel of our army to feats of heroism and valour. And the army won victories, and, while winning victories, it grew, increased in strength and became that invincible force which successfully defended the Land of Soviets against all its enemies.

There are some people who, on the strength of this, draw a comparison between Stalin and the renowned military leaders of the past.

Such comparisons, however, are entirely pointless. There is no basis for comparing

Lenin and Stalin with military leaders, although both are the greatest leaders of vast masses of people engaged in struggle, including masses organized in regular military units and armed with modern means of warfare.

Taking the Marxist conception of war as his basis, Stalin formulated the principles of a new theory of proletarian strategy and tactics.

Here is his formulation of the fundamental principles of proletarian strategy:

"The principal task of strategy is to determine the main direction in which the working-class movement is to advance and along which it is most advantageous for the proletariat to deliver its main blow at the enemy in order to achieve the aims set by the program. A strategic plan is a plan for the organization of the decisive blow in the direction in which it is most likely to produce the maximum results."*

"In other words—to define the direction of the main blow means to predetermine the character of the operations throughout the duration of the war, and, consequently, to

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* J. V. Stalin, *Collected Works,* Russ. ed., Vol. 5, p. 163.

predetermine, to the extent of nine-tenths, the fate of the entire war. That is the aim of strategy."*

Stalin represents a happy combination of a great strategist and a brilliant tactician of the proletarian revolution, dialectically applying, as a Marxist, the laws of the strategy and tactics of the class struggle to the requirements of war, to the fight waged by the armed forces of the revolution.

"Tactics," he says, "is part of strategy, subordinated to and serving the latter. Tactics deal not with a war as a whole, but with individual episodes in the war, with engagements, with battles. Whereas the aim of strategy is to win the war, or to carry to conclusion the struggle, let us say, against tsarism, the aim of tactics is rather to win individual engagements, individual battles, to carry out successfully individual campaigns, individual actions, corresponding more or less to the concrete circumstances of the struggle at any given moment.

"The principal task of tactics is to determine the ways and means, the forms and meth-

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* *Ibid.*, p. 164.

ods of struggle that are most suited to the concrete circumstances at the given moment and are most certain to prepare a strategic success. That is why tactical actions and their results should be appraised not in themselves, not from the viewpoint of their immediate effect, but from the viewpoint of the aims and possibilities of strategy."*

A study of the major operations which determined our success and victory in the Civil War, a study of Stalin's plans and the methods of their realization, clearly reveals the characteristic features of Stalin's strategy and tactics.

Here are a few examples from the Civil War, to illustrate these characteristic features.

After issuing the order for launching the attack against Denikin in the direction of Orel and Voronezh, Comrade Stalin demanded categorically of the army commanders that:

"...in working toward the objectives [they] avoid advancing in line formation, but concentrate the forces for flank attacks upon the main forces of the enemy operating in the major direction, bearing in mind that success can be

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* *Ibid.*, p. 166.

achieved only by manoeuvre. I draw special attention to the expediency of using cavalry for attacks upon the flanks and rear of the enemy, concentrating it in large formations on the flanks, thus, at the same time, ensuring the junctions."*

After we had retaken Orel and Voronezh, Comrade Stalin wrote in another *Directive*:

"I confirm this for the information of all army commanders: Remembering the conditions which enabled us to achieve success at Orel and Voronezh, do not scatter your forces but strike in the selected direction a concentrated, smashing blow, on a narrow front, with speed and determination. Maintain at all times firm contact with your detachments and with your neighbours."**

A telegram, dated November 24, 1919, and signed by Comrade Stalin, addresses to all army commanders an explanation concerning demarcation lines, of the utmost importance from the standpoint of the art of military operation:

"Fully agreeing that the troops must be broken of the pernicious habit of elbow liaison

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* Directive No. 10726, October 9, 1919.
** Directive No. 11144/op., October 20, 1919.

and taught to secure their flanks with their own resources, it is my opinion that this should be instilled by instructing and training the troops, primarily the higher officers, and not by completely repudiating the need of demarcation lines.... Above all, the troops must be taught to rid themselves of the fear of open spaces at their flanks. While maintaining close contact with the adjacent detachments, it is not necessary to seek elbow liaison, but to operate through the utmost possible concentration of striking forces on the most important operative directions. Demarcation lines, however, are necessary in order to indicate to the detachments their main, basic direction, as well as to regulate the disposition and movements of the rear institutions."*

Stalin's plan for the defeat of Denikin is incomprehensible, for instance, on the basis of arithmetical calculations determining the shortest lines of operation.

Stalin's plan of striking the main blow on the Southern Front, in the direction of Rostov through working-class Kharkov and the colliery districts of the Donets Basin, counted, first of

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* Telegram No. 678/op.

all, on sympathy and direct support to the Red Army on the part of the working class of the Ukraine and Donbas. It testifies to the fact that Stalin is not simply a military leader, a strategist in the ordinary sense. He is a military leader and a strategist of the proletarian revolution, who disposes not only of the armed forces under his immediate command, but also of vast potential reserves of man power along the main strategic direction. It is these reserves, these vast potentialities of the developing proletarian revolution—even though developing under the most difficult conditions—that Stalin, with his genius for strategy, fully and unerringly took into consideration in his remarkable plan.

At the same time Stalin always considered in his plans the potential reserves of the adversary. I shall cite as an illustration some excerpts from a letter written by Comrade Stalin to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Mounted Army on June 17, 1920:

"Dear friends:

"Keep in mind the following circumstances:

"As a rule attached to the Polish units there are *military missions* . . . of European states. The members of the missions actually

direct the Polish troops. Therefore it is absolutely essential (whenever possible) to place them under arrest and send them under reliable escort to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Front.

"As a rule there are *various Red Cross* establishments in the towns occupied by the Poles.... They are hotbeds of Polish espionage. These people must likewise be detained and conveyed to the Revolutionary Military Council.

"When falling back, the Poles leave arms with the kulaks for the purpose of subsequently unleashing banditry in the rear of our troops. It is therefore imperative that our advancing forces confiscate all arms from the population, that they do not fail to disarm the population.

"Impress upon the commanders, commissars, as well as on all the men, without exception, that we are pressing forward in order to liberate the toiling peasants from the *Polish* gentry, that ours is a war of liberation....

"Be considerate to Galician Ukrainians (Ruthenians) taken prisoner—not only peasants, but also intellectuals. Impress upon them that if the Galician Ukrainians, who are oppressed by Poland, support us, we shall march on

Lvov with the aim of liberating that city, turning it over to the Galician Ukrainians, driving out the Poles and helping the subjugated Galician Ukrainians to form their own independent state, even if it is not a Soviet state but one that maintains a favourable (sympathetic, friendly) attitude to the R.S.F.S.R. . . ."

Stalin's plan for closing the breach on the Eastern Front at Perm and for rallying the forces of the Third Army to enable it to assume the offensive against Kolchak—a plan drawn up entirely with a view to the situation in the Urals and the importance of the rear—also shows that in Stalin we have a strategist of a new type, a strategist who, in the most complicated political and military circumstances, is expert at finding the most important link so as to hold in hand the whole chain of developing events, steer them in the necessary direction and fully achieve the goal set. Stalin's "Perm" considerations represent in fact a new science bearing on the role of the rear in military operations.

Stalin has given a concise and brilliant formulation of his principles of military strategy and tactics in the short course *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

(Bolsheviks) in explaining why the Red Army emerged victorious in the Civil War.

Here we find, in the space of three pages, the entire philosophy underlying the strategy and tactics of the victorious socialist revolution.

Only Stalin, Lenin's closest associate and himself organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution and of its armed forces, could formulate the causes of our strategic and tactical victories in the war so brilliantly and with such unexcelled clarity.

Stalin's military strategy and tactics are entirely rooted in the political, class strategy and tactics of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

How, then, can a comparison be drawn between Stalin and military leaders, be they ever so outstanding, whose names have gone down in the annals of the art of war?

Stalin has formulated a new doctrine, that of the socialist state in a capitalist encirclement, and proved the necessity of maintaining the state and its chief organ—the standing army—under Communism, if our country continues to be surrounded by capitalist states.

He has revealed the changes taking place in the forms and functions of the socialist

state in a capitalist encirclement, and at the same time has outlined a new perspective of the development of its armed forces, the armed forces of the state of victorious Socialism.

Hitherto, for instance, Marxists always considered that the territorial militia principle of recruiting would be the most correct principle to be applied to the organization of the army of victorious Socialism. Thus, Engels, for instance, said in February 1845:

"In communist society it will not occur to anybody to think of a standing army. And, indeed, what would be its purpose? To safeguard the domestic tranquility of the country? As we have seen above, it will not occur to anybody to disturb that domestic tranquility. Fear of revolutions is only a result of the clash of interests; where the interests of all coincide there can be no question of such fear."*

Engels proceeded from the assumption that the victory of Socialism would take place simultaneously in all the civilized countries; he did not foresee the situation in which our

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* Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, German ed., Vol. IV, p. 375.

country, the only socialist state in the world, finds itself.

At one time our Party, too, accepted Engels' standpoint in regard to the army under Socialism. The program of the Party and the decisions of a number of its congresses stressed precisely that view of the question—that the standing army must be converted into a popular, socialist militia. That view was theoretically correct at the time. In the early years of the Soviet state we could not take into account many conditions of its development, particularly the conditions attending its existence in an encirclement by capitalist states.

Only Stalin, who has given an exhaustive description of the destinies and tasks of the socialist state, has at the same time outlined the clear perspective of the development of the armed forces of our country, even under Communism, as long as the capitalist encirclement persists.

To the extent that the spear point of the Soviet state is turned in the direction of self-defence against the surrounding capitalist world, more and more importance attaches to the armed forces of the state. However,

the territorial militia system of recruiting the Red Army does not at the present stage correspond to the tasks and interests of our defence in view of the exceptionally great scope of modern technical equipment, the difficulties involved in mastering this equipment, the complexity of the entire system of military training, and the fact that nowadays wars are not declared but start suddenly. Accordingly, the old ideas have now become obsolete, and it is necessary to adopt the cadre system of recruitment, taking into account all the specific features of the economic and political development of the country.

It is these new tasks and conditions that served as the basis for the promulgation of the new law on universal military service, to the drafting of which Comrade Stalin devoted a great deal of effort.

The principal problems that have had to be dealt with in building up the armed forces of the Soviet state from their very inception have been those of cadres, of the technical equipment of the army, and of organization.

The cadres of commanders and the political personnel, Comrade Stalin teaches us,

are the backbone of the army, its foundation; it is they that determine its fighting efficiency.

In the more than twenty years of the existence of the Red Army and Navy Comrade Stalin has devoted exceptionally great attention to the solution of the problem of cadres of commanders and the political personnel of the Red Army. His concern about the training of educated commanders, commissars and political workers for the army, who would be men of strong will, devoted to the cause of Socialism, and able to lead troops fully equipped with modern means of warfare and train them properly, is entirely in line with the way he himself has formulated the problem of cadres in general.

Stalin formulated his memorable slogan—"Cadres decide everything"—in his address to the graduates from the Red Army Academies in 1935.

"If our army possesses genuinely steeled cadres in sufficient numbers," he said on that occasion, "it will be invincible."*

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* J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow 1947, p. 525.

In solving the problem of training for the army "steeled cadres in sufficient numbers" Stalin had at various times not a few difficulties to surmount.

The trotskyites and their later accomplices, who for quite a long time occupied leading posts in the Party and in the Government, did their utmost to weaken the army cadres, to demoralize them and to turn them into a political tool for their dastardly counterrevolutionary activities, and thereby to disorganize the ranks of our Red Army.

Under Stalin's immediate direction this Trotsky-Bukharin gang and the effects of its machinations were completely wiped out.

Today the Red Army is training military and political cadres in fourteen military academies and six special military departments of higher schools. This is one of our greatest achievements—a result of Stalin's constant concern about our army cadres. Our military academies are the pride of the Red Army and of the whole country.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and the whole Red Army and Navy call Stalin their father and friend. And there is a profound meaning in this. For Stalin's concern for people

in general, and for the people in our Armed Forces in particular, is indeed that of a true friend, that of a father.

Stalin takes an interest in men and women from the lower strata of the people who show native ability and talent, boldly helps them to rise, watches their progress, knows them personally, is solicitous of them.

In speaking of our flyers Stalin has repeatedly stressed that everything must be done to safeguard their lives, that in our country the flyer's life "is more precious than any machine."

Stalin also pays a great deal of attention to the artillery cadres of the Red Army. He loves the Air Force and its winged men and women, and he values highly the tanks and their crews; but he knows, better than anybody else, the tremendous part artillery still plays in war. That is why Stalin has always, and particularly in recent years, given the closest attention to the question of trained artillery cadres and tackled it in his usual Stalin way.

The technical equipment of the Red Army and Navy, like the industrialization of the country as a whole, is closely associated with the name of Stalin. It was only through Stalin's

titanic labours that these problems have been solved. He alone was equal to the task of leading the Party and the country's finest people to the struggle for the industrialization of the country and the technical re-equipment of the entire national economy on the basis of that industrialization. It is only thanks to this that our army is now technically better equipped than any other army in the world.

With firm hand Stalin put into effect the economic ideas Lenin had outlined and confidently led the Bolshevik Party and the whole Soviet people to put an end to the backwardness of the country in industry, culture and farming. The Party, headed and led by Stalin, mercilessly exposed and demolished the trotskyites, bukharinites and their supporters with their kulak chatter about the disastrousness of the Stalin five-year plans, and switched the country from medievalism, darkness, poverty and ignorance on to the lines of modern industry and mechanized collective farming. Our country has been transformed into a great industrial power and thereby ensured against becoming a stake in the game of the imperialist powers through technical and cultural backwardness.

It is primarily, in fact only, thanks to Stalin's perspicacity and farsightedness that our Soviet Union

"has been converted from a weak country, unprepared for defence, into a country mighty in defence, a country prepared for every contingency, a country capable of producing on a mass scale all modern weapons of defence and of equipping its army with them in the event of an attack from without."*

This was said at the end of the First Five-Year Plan period. Now, with the Second Five-Year Plan and half of the Third Five-Year Plan period behind us, our defensive power has improved many times over and has developed to the point where it can fully ensure the defeat of the troops of any imperialist aggressors that may encroach upon the great socialist achievements of our people, upon the interests of the Soviet state.

Stalin always takes a personal and direct part in deciding questions pertaining to the technical reconstruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. It is he who directs the proceedings. He is the initiator of the major

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* *Ibid.*, p. 403.

organizational and technical measures designed to develop and constantly perfect Soviet armaments. He devotes much of his attention and care to military inventions and inventors, helping the latter in their work. He carefully fosters the young Soviet designers of all types of armaments and personally scrutinizes every model. Questions of introducing new designs of armaments are decided under his guidance.

Like the whole Soviet state, the Red Army is steadily growing and developing. In line with the material and cultural achievements of the country, as well as in consequence of the rapidly changing international situation, the Red Army and Navy have undergone radical changes as regards structure, armaments and numbers. The vast work of reconstructing and perfecting the armed forces has been carried out under the direct guidance of Stalin.

Stalin devotes a great deal of attention to the political apparatus of the army—that special "arm of the service" which, taken in our meaning, no other army in the world possesses, and which is one of the most powerful factors in the system of the Red Army, determining to no mean degree its fighting force and morale.

"Without the military commissars we would not have had a Red Army," Lenin said at the time of the Civil War. Stalin similarly attached exceptional importance to the institution of commissars in the Red Army. The political apparatus, Stalin teaches us, must not only cement all the links of the Red Army and its entire personnel with its political, Bolshevik influence; alongside the commander it must also ensure the fighting efficiency of the troops under any conditions. The political apparatus—the military commissar in the first place—is responsible for the political state and the morale of its unit; it is its business to look after the material interests of the men, and it is responsible for their political and fighting preparedness.

"A regimental commissar," Comrade Stalin wrote as far back as the year 1919, "is the political and moral leader of his regiment, the first to defend its material and spiritual interests. The regimental commander is the head of the regiment; the commissar must be the father and soul of his regiment."

Stalin himself was the best commissar the army had in the years of the Civil War. And it is from him we must learn the great art of giving political leadership to the troops.

Stalin's name is the symbol of the moral and political unity, the fighting capacity and perseverance of the Armed Forces of our country.

With the name of Stalin as their watchword, our men, commanders and political workers went into battle for our country, for Communism, at Lake Hasan, at the river Halkhin-Gol and during the Red Army's campaign of liberation in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. With the name of Stalin as their battle cry the Red Army units defeated the White-Finn invaders, who had perfidiously attacked our country, acting not only as representatives of the Finnish reactionaries but as the direct agents of the British, American, French, German and other imperialists. Finland suffered defeat at the hands of the Soviet troops and was forced to capitulate.

We are fully confident of the certain and complete victory of our arms over any enemy, because we have Stalin with us, because every man, commander and political worker is well aware of Stalin's constant solicitude for our socialist Motherland and for the Red Army. The thought of Stalin is ever in the heart and mind of each man, commander and political worker. At Stalin's call each is prepared without hes-

itation to give all his strength and, if need be, his life for the glory and might of the Motherland, for Communism.

Engels, Marx's great colleague, said as far back as 1845:

"Think of the marvelous deeds accomplished by the enthusiasm of the revolutionary armies in the period from 1792 to 1799, which after all fought only for an *illusion*, for the *semblance of a Motherland*, and you will come to realize how powerful must be an army which fights, not for an illusion, but for a tangible reality. . . ."*

Speaking of the defence of a communist society he said:

"In case of war . . . a member of such a society will have a *real* Motherland, a *real* home to defend, and therefore he will fight with an enthusiasm, perseverance and courage before which the mechanical training of any modern army must scatter like chaff. . . ."**

This prophecy of the founders of Marxism is coming true. The prevision of these titans of revolutionary thought has been realized in

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* Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, German ed., Vol. IV, p. 376.

** *Ibid.*

our country because, from the hands of the great Marx and Engels, the banner of Communism passed into the equally powerful hands of our great Lenin and Stalin.

The Red Army demonstrated this in the Civil War. It has demonstrated this on more than one occasion in recent years. And it owes this quality, in the first place, to the great Communist Party of Lenin and Stalin, to the organizer of the Armed Forces of the socialist state, its friend and leader—our great Stalin.

Long may our Stalin live, to the joy of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of all progressive humanity!

A COMMANDER OF GENIUS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

ON THE 21st of December 1949 the Soviet people and all progressive mankind celebrate the seventieth birthday of the greatest man on our planet, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin—their wise leader, teacher, indefatigable fighter for peace and for the independence of nations, the builder of a new human society and a commander of genius.*

* The present article was written by Comrade Voroshilov on the occasion of the seventieth birthday of Comrade Stalin.—*Ed.*

In these days throughout the world hundreds of millions of people, physical and mental workers, of every race and nationality turn their eyes with hope and brotherly trust towards the Soviet Union, to the Land of Socialism victorious, to the wise and great friend of all the oppressed—to Stalin. They know that the Soviet Union, led by the great Stalin, is a powerful fighter for peace and for Socialism, against reaction and the organizers of a new world war, a stronghold of the supporters of people's democracy in their struggle against the demented dictatorship of Anglo-American imperialism.

Through years of heroic struggle and labour the Soviet people, led by the Bolshevik Party, guided by the great leaders Lenin and Stalin, has won victories which have made world history. Having crushed the power of the capitalists and landlords, and destroyed forever the exploitation of man by man, having successfully defended their socialist Motherland and its state and political independence in the battle against internal and foreign enemies, our people has created immense material and spiritual values, has built Socialism and is effecting a successful transition to a communist society. Proud-

ly conscious of the victories it has won, on the day it celebrates the seventieth anniversary of the birth of its leader of genius, the great Stalin, the Soviet people can state: there have not been and there cannot be such obstacles and difficulties which would be insuperable for Soviet men and women, led forward on the road of victory by the great Stalin to the heights of human happiness—to Communism.

In these significant days the whole of progressive mankind beyond the frontiers of our Motherland sends with feelings of deep appreciation and love words of gratitude to the great leader and military commander, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union Stalin, who, at the head of the Soviet people and its glorious and victorious army, has ensured to hundreds of millions of people freedom, independence, the conditions for socialist transformation, and has rid all humanity of fascist slavery.

1

The correct foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Government under Stalin's wise leadership was an important factor for strengthening the international political position of the

Soviet state. Two decades of relative peace enabled the Party of Lenin and Stalin, and the whole of our people, to develop the building of socialist economy and culture at full blast, and at the same time to consolidate and perfect the defensive might of the state.

The Soviet Government heralded new principles of foreign policy, principles differing fundamentally from those practised by the imperialist states. Their newness was a consequence of the essentially new state and social system of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet system is characterized by a complete absence of the exploitation of man by man, of whatever sort this exploitation be. The Soviet state is the enemy of every manner of exploitation of one nation by another. It is a true champion of lasting democratic peace and a staunch executor of the policy of equality of all peoples and races. This summarizes the essence and novelty of the foreign policy of the socialist state; it is this that gives it prestige and moral strength in the eyes of all progressive mankind.

Thanks to their correct assessment of the international situation and their careful consideration of the relation of forces arising at

each historical period, the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Government, led by the great Stalin, have been prosecuting. most consistently, methodically and perseveringly, their own foreign policy in defence of the vital interests of not only their own country but of all peace-loving peoples, small and big, against encroachments on the part of international imperialism.

In the struggle for peace Soviet foreign policy, to which Stalin after Lenin's death has devoted so much care and attention, has succeeded in carrying out quite a number of highly important measures and state enactments.

During the Italo-Ethiopian War the Soviet representatives in the League of Nations, fighting for peace and the independence of weak countries, came out in defence of Ethiopia and strove to the very end to enforce the economic sanctions decreed against Italy as the aggressor.

When in 1936 Hitler and Mussolini in company with their underling Franco were lacerating Spain, and the British and French foreign offices encouraged the piracy of the fascist aggressors while flying the flag of "nonintervention," the Soviet Union alone rendered all pos-

sible assistance to the valiant, upright Spanish people, the first victim of fascist aggression.

And later, in 1938, when the governments of Great Britain and France tore up the treaties and agreements they had concluded and abandoned Czechoslovakia to the voracious designs of Hitler, the Soviet Union again stood alone in its readiness to take immediate action in defence of Czechoslovakia. It alone raised its voice in protest against the current treacherous policy of "appeasement" and "noninterven-tion," proposing on its part that representatives of the U.S.S.R., Britain and France meet to discuss what measures had to be taken to defend Czechoslovakia from fascist aggression.

The line of foreign policy followed by the Soviet Union sought to strengthen universal peace, international cooperation and the defence of the vital interests of the nations against the impending war danger evoked by Nazi Germany in the West and imperialist Japan in the East.

Opposed to this line was that of Anglo-French imperialism, supported by the United States and aimed at the unleashing of a big war against the U.S.S.R. The Anglo-French policy of "appeasement" and "noninterference" in the predatory designs of the German fascist aggres-

sor, which reached their point of culmination in the so-called Munich pact of 1938, brought on the Second World War.

German imperialism, which had gone down to defeat in the First World War of 1914–18, could not possibly have regained its feet and so quickly become once more an active aggressive force capable of engaging in a new military gamble, had it not been for the immense systematic financial assistance, primarily American, which fructified German industry, and in the first place her war industry.

The Soviet demand to organize collective security and a real defence of peace was interpreted by the ruling cliques in France, Britain and the United States as a sign of weak ness; and so, in opposition to it, they pursued their insidious policy of isolating the Soviet Union and inciting aggressive Hitler Germany against it.

The insidious diplomacy which was practised by the British and French and which had found graphic expression in the Munich policy was strikingly demonstrated in the negotiations they conducted with the Soviet Government in May and August 1939. Their duplicity was at its rankest during the negotiations between the

Anglo-French military missions and the Soviet military mission in Moscow that August.

As soon as our joint labours with those missions had begun it became clear that neither the British nor the French government really wanted an agreement or a military convention that might check Hitler, who was already openly threatening all Europe with bloody war. Not only did these military missions, which we supposed had come to Moscow to elaborate joint measures for curbing the aggressor, have no authority to conclude any treaty or convention. The British mission, headed by Admiral Drax, could not even find among its papers identification cards, not to speak of a warrant for the conduct of negotiations.

For two weeks the Soviet military mission, in fulfilment of the commission it had been assigned by its Government, under the personal direction of Stalin, made every effort to convince the British and French missions of the necessity of speedily concluding a military convention. It saw in this the only means, if not of stopping, then at least of retarding for some time the development of Nazi-German aggression. If Hitler should attack one of the signatories to the convention, our mission argued,

he would find himself opposed by the armed forces of three great powers. With this end in view the Soviet mission submitted a detailed and concrete plan in which it set forth the number of armed forces and the technical equipment which the Soviet Union could assign to fight the common foe. But despite all its efforts it failed, and could not but fail, to clinch the matter.

Should Britain, France, Poland and Rumania or any of them have been attacked by Hitler Germany, the Soviet Union could have rendered them military assistance only if its troops had been allowed to cross Polish or Rumanian territory, depending upon the direction in which the German fascists struck, for only with such permission could the Soviet troops have met and engaged the troops of the aggressor. No other arrangement was possible as the Soviet Union had no common border with Germany. If the makers of British and French policy had really wanted to curb Hitler, had not dishonestly engaged in double-dealing, the condition that Soviet troops be allowed to cross Poland or Rumania in order jointly to prevent or repel an attack beyond or at the borders of these countries would have been acceded to.

However the British and French military missions declined the Soviet proposals, made none of their own, and thereby wrecked the negotiations. The reactionary Polish government of that day, with the knowledge, to be sure, of their Anglo-French lords and masters, declared that at any rate it had no need of the military assistance of the U.S.S.R. and would not accept it.

As has now been established, these emissaries of Britain and France had not come to Moscow to negotiate an honest pact; their game was to intensify the provocation of an attack upon the Soviet Union by Hitler Germany.

And it was then that news of the negotiations between the British, French and German governments leaked out—negotiations which the Soviet Union could not regard otherwise than as preparations for an attack upon itself.

Our Party and Government, led by Stalin, did all in their power to block Hitler's military aggression by concerting the efforts of the countries jeopardized by it. But the hatred of the Soviet Union entertained by the rulers of Britain and France and their hope of embroiling the U.S.S.R. in war with Hitler Germany prevailed over the common sense and the true

interests of the peoples of those two countries who afterwards paid so dear for the stupid and treacherous policy their governments had waged.

Betrayed and intrigued against by the governments of Britain and France, the Soviet Union was compelled to accept Germany's offer to conclude a pact of nonaggression with her. Under the circumstances this was the only correct course open to our Government. The Soviet people, whose help the British and French "statesmen" had spurned, received a respite of a year and a half, which was used to good advantage by strengthening the defence of the country.

Such in brief was the situation when the German imperialists, after annexing Austria in 1938 and seizing Czechoslovakia a year later, launched the Second World War. They first, in September 1939, struck at Poland—the country which on the eve of the attack had so haughtily rejected the Soviet offer of military aid, aid that would have been real, powerful, capable not only of preventing the attack but of defeating the aggressor with joint forces.

By dint of circumstance the governments of Britain and France were constrained to declare

war on Germany, but the passive conduct of the Anglo-French troops, dictated by the same "Munich" policy, enabled Hitler tranquilly to continue to enhance the might of the German army and put the finishing touches on his preparations for a big war.

In the spring of 1940 fascist Germany pitted a military force of ample power against her "appeasers," Britain and France. Before long the Nazi army had occupied Denmark, Norway, Holland and Belgium. Defeated France surrendered with "lightning speed." Britain suffered a military disaster at Dunkirk. Early in 1941 the Germans seized Yugoslavia and Greece. Thus the spring of 1941 saw the whole of Western Europe, with the exception of the British Isles, brought under the rule of Hitler.

Badly mauled Britain had by that time ceased to play any military role whatever. She now sang small and refrained from irritating the infuriated Nazi führer and his frantic band.

The only real barrier left to hold back the tide of German fascism pressing on to enslave the whole of Europe and secure world domination was the Soviet Union.

This explains why fascist Germany, long before she completed the discomfiture of the West-European countries, surreptitiously made preparations for her perfidious attack upon the Land of Socialism.

2

On June 22, 1941 the German fascist army, treacherously breaking the pact of non-aggression, overran the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.

One hundred and seventy well-trained and technically equipped German divisions, concentrated on our frontiers and supported by the huge resources and rich industrial base of the countries of Europe which the fascists had captured, also the intoxication following from their easy victories in the West—all this contributed to the illusory calculations of the fascist high command that their forces would finish the war against the Soviet Union victoriously with "lightning" speed.

On June 30, 1941, the State Committee of Defence with Comrade Stalin at its head was formed. At the end of the first month of the war—on July 19, 1941, when the enemy in a mad onslaught was driving deep into our

Motherland, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. appointed Comrade Stalin People's Commissar of Defence of the Union of the S.S.R. and in August 1941, by decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Stalin took the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

By the will of the Party and the Government expressing the desires of the whole Soviet people, at the gravest moment in the life of our socialist state, when a real danger put the very existence of our Motherland in jeopardy, Stalin assumed his place at the head of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

In the course of the whole history of the Soviet state, the name of Stalin in the minds of Soviet men and women has always been associated with the idea of victory—no matter whether in the sphere of socialist construction or of war against the enemies of the Soviet people. The appointment of Stalin to the most responsible posts, therefore, was received by the Soviet public with relief and hope and filled the Soviet people with steadfast faith

in victory even in this most arduous ordeal of history.

The Soviet people were not mistaken. At the end of the fourth year of the Great Patriotic War the multimillion hitlerite army, well-drilled, equipped with modern military technique, spoiled by the easy victories in Europe, led by experienced military specialists, the army which had seemed invincible to many in the Old and the New World—suffered catastrophic defeat in single combat with the Soviet Army led by the pre-eminent communist commander, Stalin.

Here we have not the opportunity to give a somewhat exhaustive analysis of the treasure house of Stalin's strategical plans and of those brilliant operations which were organized and carried out by our heroic Armed Forces under the leadership of its great Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

But it is necessary, if only briefly, to touch on the basic stages of this grand military epic.

When studying and examining the Great Patriotic War in relation to the character and results of the most decisive operations, the course of military events may be broken up

into approximately four periods, each of which reflects the originality and constant progress of the development of the Stalin military art.

The first period includes the operations from June 1941 until about autumn 1942, that is, until our counteroffensive at Stalingrad. The Soviet Supreme Command, by active defence combined with counterattacks and counteroffensive in the most important strategic directions, undermined during this period the striking force of the fascist army and buried the German strategy of "lightning" war. The genius of Stalin's leadership and the unexampled valour of our troops during that period turned the balance of strength in our favour and thus created, in spite of the absence of a second front, favourable conditions for our troops to go over to a decisive offensive. Leningrad, Moscow, Tikhvin, Rostov, were the historic fields on which crushing blows were delivered against the German military forces. In this period the myth about the invincibility of the German army was exploded. The tireless, truly heroic labour of the Soviet people in all spheres of the national economy to meet the needs of the front, the valour of Soviet warriors at the front, the glorious battle actions of Soviet par-

tisans in the rear of the enemy, the tense effort of the country in its entirety in the name of victory have no equal in the history of nations.

The second period, from about the end of 1942, that is, from the Battle of Stalingrad to the end of 1943, is the period of the radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Army in brilliant and numerous battles once and for all wrested from the enemy the strategic initiative, consolidated its superiority over the enemy forces, went over to a resolute offensive on a huge front and liberated two-thirds of occupied Soviet territory. Suffering huge losses the armed forces of fascist Germany were compelled to go over to the defence on all fronts.

The encirclement and capture of two German fascist armies in the Battle of Stalingrad which for the Germans turned into an unprecedented slaughter, after which the hitlerite army could not recover until the end of the war, the destruction of the German's southern front, the breaking of the siege of Leningrad, the rout of the German formations in the Kursk battle—Hitler's last attempt to turn the tide of the war in his favour, the liberation of left-

bank Ukraine and the battle for the Dnieper—those were the most glorious and historic events on the road of the victorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union during this period.

The third period, including the operations of 1944, is the period of the decisive victories of the Soviet Army, known as the period of Stalin's ten blows. At this stage the sweep and overwhelming nature of the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces reached their culminating point. As a result of these operations the Balkan allies of Germany were put out of action—monarchical Rumania and tsarist Bulgaria and after that pro-fascist Finland and Hungary under Horthy, and every one of the fascist aggressors was driven beyond the frontiers of the Soviet land while all military operations were transferred to the territory of the enemy.

The defeat of the Germans at Leningrad and of the Finns in Karelia and in the Far North, the liberation of the Crimea and right-bank Ukraine, the destruction of the central German front in Byelorussia, the liberation of Western Ukraine and the Baltic Republics, the occupation of Rumania and Bulgaria and the deep penetration into Hungary—all these

operations were carried out in the style of classical Stalin offensive strategy on a gigantic scale. In these operations the Soviet Army, making use of Stalin's skilled operational manoeuvring succeeded brilliantly in breaking through the enemy's front simultaneously at several points, thus depriving him of the possibility of gathering reserves for the parrying of our powerful, sudden blows. Concomitantly, the breaches made in the enemy's front by our troops at several sectors at different times, following one upon the other, compelled the enemy to resort to frequent transfers of reserves from place to place, which wore them out physically and morally even before they were led into battle. The break-throughs our troops achieved at the junctures of the enemy armies and flanks, their emergence far in the enemy's rear, and the encirclement and annihilation of large enemy groups completed the picture of the Stalin military science in action, in combat operations of the Soviet Army unprecedented in scale, both with regard to the military strength involved and territory covered. The most perfect form of manoeuvre for the surrounding and liquidating of the chief formations of the enemy constituted during this pe-

riod the basis for the battle operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The fourth and last period—from the end of 1944 up to the end of the Second World War—may be described as the period of final victories of the Soviet Union over hitlerite Germany and of the defeat of imperialist Japan. Enriched by three years of experience in battle, having mastered to perfection all the complex forms of operational manoeuvre and tactical stratagems of total battle involving huge and skilful massing of combat armament at the required sectors, the Soviet Army rapidly overcame during this period all the long-prepared fortifications in East Prussia and in the central direction—from the Vistula to Berlin. These fortifications, no less formidable than the famous "Siegfried Line" considered by the hitlerite commanders to be an impregnable wall, were unable, however, even to check, not to speak of stopping, the swift offensive of the Soviet troops.

The most glorious victories of this period: the smashing of the southern wing of the German front and the capture of Budapest and Vienna, the defeat of the Germans in East Prussia, the crushing of the enemy's central

formations in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, in Czechoslovakia, in Silesia and Pomerania and as the final blow—the complete destruction and capitulation of the Nazi-German army and the capture of Berlin by our troops.

As a result of four years of war the Soviet people and their victorious army, thanks to Stalin's strategic genius and generalship, gained complete victory over hitlerite Germany.

The "prophecies" of the enemy camp and of one or two of the "allies" on the British Isles and across the ocean who from the first months of the war had been waiting impatiently for the defeat of the Soviet Army did not come true.

The hidden and open sabotage against the creation of a second front in the West and the strategy of minor operations practised by the Anglo-American command resulted in the concentration of the whole might of the German army against the Soviet Union. By their unworthy game of provocation the Anglo-American "allies," who desired the greatest possible exhaustion and weakening of the Soviet Union, and consequently the prolongation of the war, gave Hitler the opportunity of waging the war for three years solely on the Soviet front

without a glance behind him, having no fear for his rear, after concentrating against the Soviet Union huge masses of troops and equipment.

And only after it became obvious that the crushing blows of the Soviet Army were unavoidably fatal and that the Soviet Union single-handed and independently would put an end to Nazi Germany and her satellites, were the churchills and marshalls compelled to hurry the opening of the second front.

It now became impossible to continue to sabotage the second front, to play at opening this front, because the Soviet troops swept like an avalanche of steel across the hitlerized countries of Europe down upon Germany, the nest of hitlerism itself, crushing and hurling aside all obstacles in their way. The secret and not quite secret hopes of the churchills, marshalls and their ilk that the Soviet state would be enfeebled, bled white, in its single combat with Nazi Germany were completely dissipated. For of course it was not part of the calculations of the Anglo-American imperialist "strategists" that the fascist forces should be defeated and the peoples of Europe liberated from the slavery of the Hitler

regime solely by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. On June 5, 1944, that is, after a delay of as much as two years, allied troops were landed in Normandy, in the north of France.

3

Throughout the Second World War the military thought of the fascist generals, at the base of which lay a reactionary, because idealistic, world outlook—added nothing new and could add nothing new to the general principles of warfare of bourgeois states. The most that the fascist military clique showed itself capable of was to turn once again to the adventuristic idea of "blitzkrieg" already proved bankrupt in the First World War, a conception which reflected the organic inability of the German militarists to attain to the level of a scientific understanding of modern war.

The crushing defeat which fascist Germany inflicted on the armies of Western Europe in exceptionally short time at the beginning of the Second World War, which turned the heads of the Nazi chiefs, seemed to confirm the correctness of the conception underlying the "blitzkrieg" and to prove the capacity of the

German war machine to apply this conception to any army under any conditions.

Therefore in calculating on a rapid defeat of the Soviet Union the Hitler command relied entirely on the idea of a "lightning" war, on the "invincibility" of German arms and the decisive part played by the factor of surprise.

The results of the war of hitlerite Germany against the U.S.S.R. showed the utter absurdity of counting on victory by "blitzkrieg" methods. That which for hitlerism was effective and real when it concerned the capitalist countries of Western Europe, became illusory and disastrous in war against the Soviet Union.

The German fascist idea of a "lightning" war applied to the Soviet Union without taking into consideration the actual social-economic and moral and political forces and potentialities of a new, noncapitalist adversary, gave the so-called Barbarossa plan (of war against the U.S.S.R.) a purely adventurist character and was bound to turn, and did turn, into an enormous military adventure, into a tragedy for the entire German nation.

Only in the U.S.S.R. in conditions of a socialist system, in conditions of the dominance

of Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist practice, is real military science possible.

Soviet military science was born and perfected simultaneously with the beginning and development of the Armed Forces of the Soviet land. Military science is rightly called by us Stalin military science. From the first days of the creation of the Soviet Armed Forces Stalin gave much attention and spent considerable effort on the scientific elaboration and theoretic substantiation of the principles of Soviet military science.

Stalin military science, basing itself on a correct understanding of the laws of social development, was born with the coming to power of the working class, developed and strengthened itself on the foundation of the Soviet state system. Such decisive elements as a new, socialist system of society with a planned economy, new productive forces and new relations of production among people possessing a new ideology and new moral standard form the base on which rests the whole edifice of Stalin military science.

Being a harmonious system of really scientific knowledge of the whole complex body of questions of modern war, Stalin mili-

tary science, apart from purely military elements—strategy, operational skill, tactics, the organization and training of troops—embraces the sum total of social-political, economic and moral factors in their interaction and determining influence on warfare as a whole.

Soviet military art, as a component part of a military science that had discriminatingly assimilated the experience of past wars, redrawn its lessons and adapted them to the socialist nature of the state, has armed our commanding cadres with theoretical and practical knowledge in the field of strategy, operational skill, tactics, the organization and training of troops, and has thus allowed them to understand correctly the character of war, to comprehend the nature of modern operations and battle and also the role of various types of troops, their importance and practical use.

In this connection it is especially necessary to emphasize the Stalin treatment of the question of constantly operating factors, among which the importance of the economic and moral potential of the country is given one of the decisive places in the organization and attainment of victory in modern war.

Stalin has divided these factors strictly into two groups: temporary, fortuitous, and constantly operating factors—and has designated the appropriate place, role and importance of each, as well as their mutual connection.

Of all the temporary, fortuitous factors on which the strategic calculations of the German command in planning war against the Soviet Union were based—Stalin singles out "the element of surprise" as the most effective military factor.

To the second group of factors determining the course and outcome of a war Stalin refers: the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army and the organizational ability of the commanding personnel of the army.

"Now the outcome of the war," Comrade Stalin wrote in his Order of the Day of February 23, 1942, "will be decided not by such a fortuitous element as surprise, but by permanently operating factors: stability of the rear, morale of the army, quantity and quality of divisions, equipment of the army and organizing ability of the commanding personnel of the army. At this point one cir-

cumstance ought to be noted: the element of surprise had only to disappear from the Germans' stock-in-trade for the German fascist army to find itself faced with disaster."*

The deep scientific analysis of these factors given by Stalin has immense not only theoretical but—in conditions of the fiercest warfare—also practical significance. Soviet people have received the key to understanding the perspective of war and the inevitability of the victory of the Soviet Union. It is not by chance that in his speeches Stalin touches many times either on all these factors in their entirety or on one of them in accordance with the circumstances in which events took place.

Stalin's thesis about the advantages and significance of the enduring constantly operating factors and the limitations of the temporary, fortuitous factors—implanted in the Soviet people and their army a firm conviction in our superiority over the enemy, confirmed our unshakeable faith in victory, mobilized us for heroic deeds at the front, and for great feats of labour in the rear. Faith in our own strength and

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* J. Stalin, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Moscow 1946, p. 45.

the steadfast certainty of victory were a powerful factor and the natural prerequisite of victory.

In the idea of the stability of the rear is included all that constitutes the life and activity of the whole state—social system, politics, economy, the apparatus of production, the degree of organization of the working people, the ideology, science, art, moral condition of the people and other things.

Modern war obliterates the line that divides the front from the rear. "It is not only a war between two armies; ... it has converted our country into one all-inclusive rear, which serves the front...."*

Under modern conditions the fighting efficiency of an army is largely determined by the fighting efficiency of the rear, i.e., of the state as a whole. "No army in the world," Stalin said as long as almost thirty years ago, "can be victorious (referring, of course, to lasting and solid victory) without a stable rear. The rear is of prime importance to the front, for it, and it alone, supplies the front not only with every type of equipment but also with personnel—fighters, their ideas and sen-

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* *Ibid.*, pp. 15 and 19.

timents. An unstable rear, and so much the more a hostile rear, is sure to turn the best and most firmly cemented army into an unstable and decrepit mass."* Applied to modern war, this Stalin thesis is so much the more correct.

The scale of modern military operations, the vast number of the people taking part in them and the huge quantity of technical battle equipment employed, place on the rear (i.e., the whole country) extremely high demands on the timely fulfilment of which depends the outcome of the battle actions of the troops and, in the final account, the outcome of the war as a whole.

But modern war, more than any war of the past, is also an acid test of the political strength, the stability of the belligerent state, and not only of its economy, but also of its political, moral and organizational mainstays, of the spirit of the people and consequently of the moral stamina of the army.

Lenin said: "War is a test of all the economic and organizational forces of each nation. In

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* J. Stalin, *Collected Works*, Russ. ed., Vol. 4, p. 323.

the final analysis . . . we are and shall be victorious because we have a rear, and a strong rear at that, because, in spite of hunger and cold, the peasants and workers are united, have become strong and answer every severe blow by more firmly interlinking their forces with their economic might. This is the only reason why the victories won over Kolchak, Yudenich and their allies, the strongest powers in the world, were possible."*

The strong Soviet rear was the deciding factor of the victorious issue of the Civil War; the unstable rear of Denikin, Kolchak, Wrangel and all the other agents of the foreign imperialists predetermined their defeat.

The genius of Stalin in foreseeing even at the beginning of the war the inevitable defeat of the hitlerite army was founded on a knowledge of the relative political, economic and social weakness of hitlerite Germany, that is, the instability of its rear, and on the certitude of the stability of the Soviet rear, that is, of our whole state.

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* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 3rd Russ. ed., Vol. XXIV, p. 544.

Enumerating the miscalculations of the German high command in the strategic planning of the war, Stalin gives first place to their miscalculations regarding the condition of their own rear and that of their opponent.

"...The enemy sadly miscalculated," says Stalin. "He failed to take into account the strength of the Red Army, failed to take into account the stability of the Soviet rear, failed to take into account the determination of the peoples of our country to achieve victory, failed to take into account the unreliability of the European rear of fascist Germany, and, lastly, he failed to take into account the inherent weakness of fascist Germany and her army."*

Analyzing the course and motive forces of the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Hitler Germany Stalin stresses in particular the stability, the unshakeable firmness of the Soviet state as the basic and decisive factor, as the all-embracing rear of the Red Army capable of supplying the latter uninterruptedly with first-class man power replenishments,

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* J. Stalin, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Moscow 1946, pp. 43-44.

high-quality matériel in sufficient quantity and corresponding moral and political sentiments.

"Never has the Soviet rear been so firm as it is today," Stalin said in his speech of November 6, 1941. "It is quite likely that if any other country had lost as much territory as we have lost now it would not have stood the test and would have fallen into decline. If the Soviet system has stood the test so well and has even strengthened its rear, it must mean that the Soviet system is now a most stable one."*

And it was precisely when he assayed the decisive role of the rear in modern war that Stalin, in his first speech, on July 3, 1941, assigned such a prominent place to the Soviet rear.

Having placed before the rear the general task of putting all enterprises and institutions on a war footing and having pointed out the need for raising the productivity of labour and increasing the productive capacities of our factories and mills to the levels necessitated by the proportions of the war that had broken out, Stalin concretized these tasks in his speech

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* *Ibid.*, p. 23.

so simply and clearly for every worker, kolkhoznik and Soviet intellectual as only he, our Stalin, can.

To questions of the organization and work of the Soviet rear Stalin returned in his speeches and Orders of the Day many times and at all stages of the war, emphasizing the exceptional and decisive importance of the rear in the work of carrying out military operations and ensuring the destruction of the enemy.

At the first stage of the war, when the circumstances demanded that the enemy's offensive be checked by tiring out and wearing down his most stalwart cadres and his numerous engines of war, the firm Soviet rear was the life-giving source that provided the sustenance for the heroic exploits of the Soviet Army that was defending every inch of Soviet soil.

At the second stage of the war, when the Soviet Army assumed the offensive, when major military successes began to be placed to the credit of the Soviet troops, when as a result of offensive operations splendidly carried out by the Soviet Army the defeat of the German war machine became inevitable and the German fascist invaders were driven from Soviet

soil, Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, found the indestructible strength and fortitude of the Soviet rear to be a decisive precondition of the triumph of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

In his speech of November 6, 1944, Stalin said: "The fact that the Red Army was able successfully to perform its duty to our country and has expelled the Germans from the boundaries of our Soviet territory is due to the devoted support it received from the rear, from our entire country, from all the peoples of our country."*

While speaking of the rear in its broad sense, special emphasis must be given to the role and significance of the rear of an army in the field.

This manifold and complex supply organism, whose function it was to provide the multimillion Army and Navy and Air Force with all that modern mechanized war greedily devoured without stop and in huge quantities, to provide the troops at the front that stretched for almost three thousand kilometres across forests, swamps, steppes, rivers and seas, rep-

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* *Ibid.*, p. 162.

resented a complicated problem which only an organizational genius like Stalin could solve promptly and wisely. To this most serious task Stalin devoted much time and creative energy throughout the war, in addition to his major task of providing leadership.

The next of the constantly operating factors is the morale of the army.

This factor is connected organically with the moral and political condition of the rear, which feeds the army not only with all kinds of equipment—with ammunition, technical equipment, armaments, food, man power, but also with ideas, ideology, moods and morale.

In all the wars of the past the moral steadfastness of fighting armies always played a role of primary importance. And in modern wars when not only the army fights but the whole country, the whole people, when armies many million strong on both sides take part in battle operations, when extremely long and tense battles are fought, the moral steadfastness, the endurance, the heroism of the troops engaged acquired extraordinary significance. That is why Stalin singles out this factor particularly as one of the decisive factors of the Great Patriotic War.

All the commanders and theoreticians of military affairs in the past also assigned great importance to the moral factor. But they regarded it as an isolated element, unrelated to the character of war, to the social-political, economic and moral-ideological principles of the warring states, dissociated from the masses of the people—the main source of strength, deciding, in the final account, victory over the enemy.

Heroism, staunchness, courage, ability to cope with difficulties and the will to victory were all achieved in various ways at various times by the armies of the various countries. However the diverse methods of inculcating and maintaining the spirit of troops, whether mercenary or mobilized, were grounded on elements of moral and physical action upon them: drilling, strict discipline (frequently the discipline of the rod), fear of one's superiors, of God and the like. These were the methods resorted to to ensure the fighting spirit in feudal-landlord and bourgeois-capitalist armies. The modern armies of the imperialist states even today receive their moral and political training, their army spirit, in about the same way.

Much has been written by bourgeois military writers about the moral factor of troops and its importance but their interpretation of the question of the moral qualities of an army has nothing in common with the treatment of this question by Stalin. Stalin makes the moral factor, the spirit of the army, dependent primarily on the nature of the political aims of the war and consequently on the nature of the social system, the nature of the domestic and foreign policy of the given state, on the level of consciousness and culture of the broad masses of the people, on the dominant ideology, etc.

Of what moral spirit could the German fascist army be possessed if this "spirit" was nurtured by the piratical policy of a handful of political scoundrels who were effectuating the will of German imperialism? What moral "spirit" could the army of Nazi Germany have when it was under orders to seize foreign lands, to violate, plunder and enslave other peoples, when it was imbued with a brutal, misanthropic ideology which rejected all international codes and rules of human morality.

The morale of such armies will remain intact as long as for some reason or other

they meet with easy success at the front, permitting the mass of the soldiery to engage in plunder and violence. But no sooner do they encounter real resistance on the part of politically and militarily strong opponents and suffer defeat once or twice than their "moral spirit" vanishes into thin air, leaving nothing but a stench behind, as happened with Hitler's army and the army of Chiang Kai-shek, the foe of the Chinese people, and as is certain to happen to all other armies of aggressive, imperialist states.

In developing and deepening the teaching of Marxism-Leninism on war and the army, Stalin, with the lucidity characteristic of him, revealed the essence and role of the moral factor, that most important element in any war, particularly modern, mechanized war.

The morale of the army, as Stalin teaches, depends in the first place and above all on the nature of the political aims of the war, that is, on what the state is fighting for, on the degree of consciousness of the men and commanders of the army, on the depth of their understanding of the justness of the war which is taking place and the necessity of waging it to save their own country from the attacker,

the aggressive enemy, on the depth of their love for their Motherland and of their faith in the righteousness of their cause, of their faith in victory, of their faith in the leaders of the country and of the armed forces in the field.

Analyzing the causes that led to the failure of the "lightning" war of the Germans at the first stage of the war, Stalin stressed the moral superiority of the Soviet Army that followed logically from the political aims of the war and from the fact that these aims were understood by the whole personnel of the Soviet Army.

"...The morale of our Army is higher than that of the German, for it is defending its native land against alien invaders and believes in the justice of its cause, whereas the German army is waging a war of annexation, is plundering a foreign country, and is unable to believe even for a moment in the justice of its vile cause."*

The noble and lofty aims of the war—and such were the aims of the Patriotic War of the

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* J. Stalin, *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Moscow 1946, p. 23.

Soviet people and its army defending their socialist Motherland from the aggression of bestial fascism—in these lies the guarantee of the unshakeable morale of a patriotic people and its army.

The other constantly operating factors—the quantity and quality of divisions, the equipment of the army, the organizational abilities of the commanding personnel, by which the framework of the strategic planning of the war and its execution are conditioned—are obvious and irrefutable, the more so in that they are, at bottom, determined by that same economic and moral and political might of the country.

The other side of the same question of long-term, constantly operating factors is that in the course of the war it was necessary to ensure that the balance of these factors was in our favour since constantly operating factors are not a definite, immutable quantity. This favourable balance is created not by its own momentum, not mechanically but by the intense labour of the people and by correct leadership. The building up of this balance of all the decisive, enduring and constantly operating factors which ensured, in the final ac-

count, victory to Soviet arms was one of the greatest merits of the Party of Lenin and Stalin and of the leader of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

In line with the thesis concerning the constantly operating factors of victory, in the strategic planning of the war and its decisive campaigns and separate operations stands another, no less important thesis—concerning reserves.

Stalin has always paid very serious attention to the reserves. His evaluation of the role of reserves even during the Civil War and the intervention is well known.

That is why in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War alongside of the organization of active defence, the accumulation of strategic and operational reserves for the waging of a prolonged and victorious war occupied the lion's share of Stalin's attention.

Formulating his famous thesis on the permanently operating factors when the war was still in its initial and most critical period, Stalin considered it the fundamental, decisive task confronting the country "that in our country the training of reserves in aid of the

front should not be relaxed for a moment. It is essential that more and more units should march to the front to forge victory over the infuriated enemy. It is essential that our industry, particularly our war industry, should work with redoubled energy. It is essential that with every passing day the front should receive ever more tanks, aircraft, guns, mortars, machine guns, rifles, automatics and ammunition."*

This task of accumulating reserves, set by the great Stalin alongside of other tasks, was successfully accomplished by the Soviet people. This permitted Stalin subsequently to declare: "In the course of the war the Red Army was infused with new vital forces; it received replenishments of men and equipment; new reserve divisions came to its aid, and the time came when the Red Army was able to assume the offensive on the main sectors of the vast front."**

It is known that at all stages of the war every operation by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief had to be ensured by

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* *Ibid.*, p. 46.
** *Ibid.*, p. 44.

the reserves necessary for its execution. In this lies one of the particularities of Stalin's strategical leadership of the battle actions of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief solved brilliantly one of the most important problems—the problem of creating commanding personnel.

During the course of the war new Soviet military commanders, generals and other officers grew up who proved in action their devotion to their Motherland, to the Bolshevik Party, and who were able in huge battles to turn Stalin's strategic and operational-tactical plans into a living reality.

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The Great Patriotic War with a front extending upon thousands of kilometres demanded of the Soviet military command the solution of a most complex problem—the problem of organizing the strategic synchronization of several fronts. The organization, the uninterrupted supplying and conduct of operations of a sim-

ilar kind directed, according to a single plan, towards the attainment of a single strategic aim, is a matter of extreme complexity and difficulty. This problem could be coped with only by Stalin's military genius, and he supplied its complete solution.

The offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942-43 and particularly the liberation of left-bank Ukraine in 1943, after the victory of our army on the Kursk bulge, was carried out with amazing determination by the synchronized operations of many fronts, united in a thousand-kilometre theatre of military activity by a single strategic plan and the single commanding will of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, by the will of the great Stalin.

Even more amazing in their exceptionally extensive sweep and brilliant results from the point of view of synchronization of fronts were the offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1944-45, when on an enormous expanse of territory, from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, Soviet troops with consecutive and simultaneous crushing blows definitely annihilated the armies of fascist Germany and her allies.

In all these brilliant Stalin operations, both

the synchronization of groups of fronts in one strategic direction and the synchronization of fronts operating in separate directions, but all of them coordinated by the unity of Stalin's strategic plan, found their full expression. The genius of Stalin inspired the commanders of fronts and armies, officers and men of the mighty Soviet Army, to heroic feats in the name of their socialist Motherland.

In the Great Patriotic War under the leadership of Stalin one of the most complex and difficult problems of the art of war—the manoeuvre for the encirclement and annihilation of great masses of enemy troops—was fully solved in a practical way. In the course of the last war the German fascist command sought many times but without success to carry out a strategic manoeuvre of this kind against Soviet troops. In the offensive operations of the Soviet Army this strategic encircling manoeuvre became the principal form of its battle action.

The Germans had always considered that they held a monopoly on this form of fighting, the essential features of which found their clearest expression in the ancient Battle

of Cannae;* and the Germans were most vociferous on this score after the disaster the French army met with at Sedan** during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. But, as is known, this German pretension found no practical realization even in the first imperialist war. All attempts of the German command to pocket at least a minor "Cannae" ended in failure.

The development of powerful mobile engines of war, especially tanks and aircraft, increased the ambition of the Prussian-fascist militarists to build their strategic plans upon this encirclement manoeuvre and to make it the principal method in their theory of "lightning" warfare.

It is known that the drives upon Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk were conceived by the Germans as operations aiming at strategic en-

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* *Cannae* (*Canne*). A village in Italy, near which in 216 B.C. the numerically inferior Carthaginian army under Hannibal (50,000 men) surrounded the Roman army (69,000 men) and almost entirely destroyed it.

** *Sedan.* City and fortress in the Northeast of France, where in 1870 a French army 100,000 strong, headed by Napoleon III, was surrounded, and capitulated after some brief fighting.

circlement, but all these operations, despite the vast manoeuvring and breaching power of the fascist armies, ended in complete failure and they themselves, as happened at Stalingrad, became the object of the grand Cannae of the twentieth century, executed by the Soviet Army under the supreme command of the great Stalin.

The demands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin—"to cut the enemy's communications by skilful and daring manoeuvres, surround and break up his forces and destroy and capture his man power and matériel"—fully materialized in a variety of forms of encirclement used by the Soviet Army under the various conditions and circumstances of battle, and thus the widespread theory of bourgeois military specialists concerning the exceptional rarity and fortuity of encircling operations was refuted in deed. What was impossible for the bourgeois armies in the First World War, and for the German fascist army in its operations against the Soviet troops in the Second World War, became possible and realizable for the Armed Forces of the Soviet state.

The outstanding operations of encirclement and complete defeat of the enemy—at Stalin-

grad, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Minsk, Jassy-Kishinev, Berlin and many other places—were a brilliant demonstration of the growth and maturity of Soviet soldiers, officers and generals of the Stalin school, who in the course of the Great Patriotic War had been gradually mastering, and finally mastered to perfection, this most complex form of strategic and tactical operational manoeuvre, embodying it creatively under the most varied conditions of troop warfare.

After the historic battle at Kursk which buried forever the hitlerite offensive strategy, the fascist army suffered, right up till the Berlin capitulation, consecutive crushing defeats resembling more or less the debacle at Stalingrad.

From now on the historians of war and military art will not talk only of "Cannae" and "Sedan." The Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War transformed Stalin's strategic ideas into a reality and gave history remarkable examples of the execution and results of large encircling operations and the liquidation of the chief enemy groups. Many of these operations will be recorded as classical examples in the history of war.

It is known that in modern offensive operations in the overwhelming majority of cases where the lines of the enemy are deeply echeloned and powerfully defended, the decisive place belongs to the frontal blow as the radical method of breaking through these lines and developing the success far within the enemy's defences.

The now well-known battles of Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and others strikingly illustrate the impotence of the Nazi-German army with regard to this highly important tactical and operational problem. In spite of the fact that the designated strategic objectives were of paramount importance in the calculations of the Hitler command, it did not succeed in crushing our defence. On the contrary, the counteroffensive of the Soviet Army at these lines of the front caused the Germans to suffer, as is known, defeat at Moscow and Kursk, utter disaster at Stalingrad, and, in January 1943, tremendous losses at Leningrad, incapacitating them from holding the line of the blockade.

The Soviet Supreme Command, confronted during the war with the necessity of smashing the German fascist defences which had been

brought to a high degree of perfection, found the strength, means and tactical-operational methods of solving this most difficult problem with enormous effect. Moreover, in numerous offensive operations to break through the defending front, the Soviet Supreme Command used the frontal blow in a great variety of ways. Such a frontal blow, after destroying the defences of the enemy, was quickly developed with the aid of powerful mobile forces—tanks, self-propelled artillery, motorized infantry and cavalry in coordination with air forces—into other types of manoeuvre, and inevitably led to the encirclement and liquidation of the enemy's troops, or to the defeat and pursuit of the enemy to a depth of strategic importance.

A powerful frontal blow in one direction, a series of shattering blows in several others breaking up the enemy's defence on a wide front, a blow splitting his front to a great depth—all these Stalin forms of manoeuvre, strictly coordinated in operational and operational-strategical synchronization, were widely used in the offensive operations of the Soviet Army. The battle operations of our troops assumed a particularly destructive character in 1943-45,

when thanks to the heroic work of the Soviet people in the rear the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was able to create the necessary concentration of striking forces and ordnance (tanks, air forces, self-propelled and other artillery) in the chief directions of the break-through. Under these conditions the German fascist defensive front definitely collapsed throughout its tactical depth on the day of the operation or the day after. As a result of this the offensive, as a rule, developed at extraordinarily high speed.

There should be mentioned such a decisive form of battle as strategic counterattack. Making use of it in the first stage of the war under conditions of the enemy's overwhelming superiority in forces and equipment, the Soviet Armed Forces, having bled him dry in active defence, gained the operational and strategic initiative and created conditions for the subsequent counteroffensive operations on a gigantic scale along the entire Soviet-German Front.

What has been said above by no means exhausts the whole wealth of strategic and operational-tactical problems so successfully solved in the Great Patriotic War under the supreme

command of the great Stalin by the excellent Soviet General Staff, by the corps of officers and the whole mighty, valorous Soviet Army and Navy.

The huge sweep of consecutive and simultaneous operations along the front and in great depth, with their crushing character and speed; the skilled tactical and operational synchronization of all types of troops, combined with flexible and daring manoeuvre under any kind of fighting conditions; active defence brought to perfection, capable of resisting blows of any strength and ensuring conditions for going over to a resolute counteroffensive; the effective use of massed armoured troops and aviation in the main directions of the offensive for the overwhelming of the whole operational-strategic depth of the enemy; artillery offensive as the most rational way of using all types of cannon, and a whole series of other important problems found their correct and fullest solution in the combat activity of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.

The great, victorious Patriotic War will go down in history as a triumph of the Soviet socialist system, as a proof of the superiority of the Armed Forces of Socialism over the

fascist armies, as the undeniable proof of the superiority of Soviet, Stalin military science over the reactionary doctrine of German imperialism, as the triumph of the generalship, of the strategic and military genius of the great Stalin.

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After the termination of the Second World War the relations between the U.S.S.R. and its recent allies in the war can be briefly described as a very tense struggle waged by the Soviet state for the triumph of the inviolable principles of the Stalin Soviet foreign policy, a struggle for a lasting peace all over the world, for independence, democracy and amity among nations.

Trampling underfoot the solemnly proclaimed and jointly adopted decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences of the victor countries concerning the prevention of new German aggression and the taking of concerted action by the powers that had comprised the anti-Hitler coalition in the interest of arranging peace and security in Europe and the whole world on a democratic basis, Anglo-American imperialism took the course of isolating the Soviet

Union, the course of openly organizing and preparing a new world war.

The United States, Britain and France, who had undertaken, together with the U.S.S.R., to complete the demilitarization and democratization of Germany and on this basis to arrange the postwar settlement of Europe in the interest of peace and universal security, treacherously violated these commitments. Having dismembered Germany by their separate actions, the United States, Britain and France opened wide the door in the Western zone to all Nazi-Hitler elements, thereby laying anew the foundation of European and world military aggression.

The Truman doctrine and the ill-starred "Marshall plan" for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, supplemented by the North-Atlantic bloc of the Marshallized countries, were a direct challenge to universal peace and security. The aims and objects of Anglo-American imperialism now lay exposed in all their nakedness. For instance, the newly created puppet state styled "West-German," with its seat at Bonn, is nothing but a revival of German revancheism and militarism. It converts the western part of Germany into a seat of new

aggression and military adventures directed in the first place against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

The formation in Berlin, on October 7, 1949, of the German Democratic Republic was a cruel blow to the imperialist designs of the Anglo-American-French fabricators of new world-wide war chaos.

The best people of Germany were now given a real opportunity to concentrate all their efforts on the building of a united peace-loving democratic German Republic. This is a guarantee of the regeneration of the German people; herein lies the possibility of their joining the camp of peaceable, democratic states which are waging a struggle for peace, progress and friendship among nations and against the imperialist instigators of a new war; here they will find their salvation from new military concussions and ultimate ruin and destruction.

In his historic greeting addressed to Wilhelm Pieck, President of the German Democratic Republic, and Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister, the great Stalin said: "The formation of the peace-loving German Democratic Republic marks a turning point in the history of Europe.

There can be no doubt but that the existence of a peace-loving democratic Germany alongside of a peace-loving Soviet Union precludes the possibility of new wars in Europe, puts an end to bloodshedding in Europe and makes the enslavement of European countries by the world imperialists impossible."* And he continued further on: "If these two peoples are determined to make the same strenuous effort in their fight for peace as when they carried on the war, peace in Europe may be considered assured."**

The great Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, the foremost champion of peace, said what is in the minds of all our people, what is close to the hearts of all the men and women who strive for peace, progress and a better life for humankind.

"You may be certain," Stalin said later on in his greeting, "that in pursuing this road and strengthening the cause of peace, you will meet with great sympathy and active support on the part of all the peoples of the world, including the American, English, French, Polish, Czecho-

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* *Pravda*, No. 287, October 14, 1949.
** *Ibid.*

slovak and Italian peoples, not to mention the peaceable Soviet people."*

Only he, the great leader of the powerful Soviet state, Stalin, whose genius can discern events concealed in the bosom of the future, could so clearly and truthfully express not only the thoughts and hopes of the German people, not only the sentiments and ideas of the Soviet people, but also the wishes and aspirations of all progressive humanity. Every upright, freedom-loving and progressive person in the world most enthusiastically welcomed Stalin's words, which inspire the democrats of postwar Germany to fight stubbornly for peace, for a democratic, independent. peace-loving new and united Germany.

The postwar Anglo-American policy of splitting Europe, which attests at one and the same time to the predatory, annexationist longings of American imperialism and its blind, panic fear of the steadily growing prestige of the U.S.S.R., the mighty defender of universal peace and the sovereign rights of the peace-loving nations, is a repetition of the foreign policy pursued by Britain and France during

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* *Ibid.*

the period of preparation of the Second World War.

It is therefore not surprising that the latter-day advocates of a continuation of "Munich," with the American Munichers at their head, so industriously falsify the facts of history and conceal all traces of treacherous practices during the period preceding the past war. Now as before they are compelled to hoodwink public opinion regarding the real part being played by the U.S.S.R., namely, that of a true and resolute protector of the peace, a champion of progress and of the independence of the democratic states and peoples.

But the world situation has changed.

All progressive mankind knows full well, despite the systematic filthy slander and lies spread by official personages in high places as well as by the venal imperialist press about the Soviet Union, that the great Stalin, the head of the Government and leader of the peoples of the Soviet state, has always been and continues to be a true and staunch fighter for and organizer of peace throughout the world.

In this noble cause the mighty people of the Soviet Union in their entirety have always

given their undivided support to Stalin, their beloved, tried and tested leader. The heroic Soviet people are only too well acquainted with war. In their short history they have given copiously of their sacred blood in the fight against the imperialist pirates for the right to live without oppressors, for the right to build their peaceful socialist life. The people of the U.S.S.R. love freedom and peace; they are mighty and firmly welded together; they are ideologically strong and highly cultured. In their van there is the Party of Lenin and Stalin, unexampled in degree of organization and singleness of ideological purpose; their leader is Stalin, the man who is first in the world. Our heroic people are magnanimous, forgiving.

But neither our people nor our state are heedless. Stalin, the Bolshevik Party, the Government are vigilant. They do all that is necessary in order that our great socialist Motherland may at all times be safely defended and protected from all overt and covert, insidious and base enemies, who, true enough, are always defeated anyway.

The undeviating Stalin peace policy and the concomitant policy of widely exposing the

aggressive, predatory plans of the Anglo-American imperialists and their ilk, policies which have been steadfastly and honestly pursued by the Soviet Government, have added immensely to the prestige of the U.S.S.R. and its international importance. The U.S.S.R. has become the decisive force in the struggle for universal democratic peace and international security.

The Soviet people start from the premise that it is possible for the two systems, the capitalist and the socialist, to coexist for a long period of time on the basis of international democratic business cooperation. The great Stalin and other representatives of the Soviet Government have on numerous occasions made official statements to this effect. Soviet men and women under the guidance of their great leader have fought and will continue to fight for peace throughout the world and unmercifully to expose the advocates and instigators of a new world war.

The American imperialists are madly speculating on the stock exchange, taking full advantage of the bull market fostered by the disappearance from the world arena of their former competitors Germany and Japan and

the reducing of Britain to the role of a second-rate, subordinate power. The more the end of the Second World War recedes into the past the more insolently and frankly do they carry into execution a thought-out and determined plan of action in the economic, strategic and ideological fields, a plan which pursues the same objective as Hitler did in his day, namely, world domination.

To screen its predatory, aggressive ambitions international imperialism trots out the time-worn "argument" that one must fight Communism, must fight Bolshevism. The struggle against Bolshevism was used as the argument to justify the military intervention of German, Anglo-French and Japanese-American imperialism in Soviet Russia during the Civil War. Under the pretext of saving Asia from the communist menace Japan in 1931-32 invaded Manchuria and somewhat later directed its "salvation" steps into North and Central China; the salvation of Germany from Communism was used as the pretext that in 1933 put Hitler in power. The same bogey, the danger of Communism, was used in 1936 to explain Germany's and Italy's incursion into Spain. Fighting Bolshevism was the os-

tensible reason assigned by Germany and Japan for the conclusion between them of the so-called anti-Comintern pact, whereas in reality it was really concluded for the purpose of openly preparing the Second World War for world domination. Fighting Communism was the argument used to explain the entire Munich policy of France and Britain, the policy of fostering and training the German aggressor, who was not slow in "generously repaying" his "benefactors."

The undermining activity of the imperialist, anti-democratic bloc is now wholly and openly directed toward the conversion of the United Nations into a blind tool of the expansionist, marauding policy of the U.S.A., toward the justification of the criminal propaganda for and preparation of a new war.

The unmitigated lie of the ranting imperialists that some sort of danger emanating from "world Bolshevism," from the U.S.S.R., is threatening the United States or Great Britain is intended to conceal the armament race going on in the United States, to hide the immense swelling of its war budgets, to mask its imperialist, aggressive policy, to divert the

attention of world public opinion from the building of air and sea bases by the United States on foreign territory, in every part of the globe.

The artificially sustained hullabaloo about the danger of a third world war is meant, as Stalin said, for people with weak nerves. But the Soviet people's nerves are sufficiently strong and their minds sufficiently clear to discern behind the threats of the instigators of a new war their sordid purposes, and to refuse to be frightened by all their clamour and "atomic" blackmail. The people of the Soviet Union are aware of the might and invincible strength of their state, are aware of the vigilance and farsightedness of their Government, of their Party of Lenin and Stalin, are aware of the sublime wisdom and versatile genius of their great leader, Stalin. They believe and it is their firm conviction that the irreproachably straightforward and honest foreign policy pursued by the Soviet state, a policy of peace that has called forth the trust and admiration of the freedom-loving peoples of the whole world, will triumph and subdue all the sinister forces of imperialist reaction that has taken leave of its senses.

As an earnest of this we have the universal, globe-encircling movement of all right-minded people, who have joined the ranks of active supporters of and fighters for peace, democracy and friendship among nations, and against imperialism and warmongering, against the new aspirants to world rule.

Frothing at the mouth, imperialism frantically seeks ways and means of intimidating, enervating and weakening this or that group of fighters for peace, of stabbing them in the back, of inflicting the greatest possible harm to the camp fighting for peace, democracy and progress.

To this end a furious campaign of incitement against and persecution of Communists and honest democrats has been conducted in the countries of imperialist dictatorship; to this end embattled Greek patriots are being killed off, Indonesian, Viet-Nam and Malay fighters for the national emancipation of their countries are being persecuted; to this end imperialism has bought and made subservient to itself the traitorous band of Tito in Yugoslavia.

Resorting to monstrous hypocrisy, such as vows of loyalty to Socialism, the Tito clique

has tried to deceive the Yugoslav people and the peoples in the democratic camp, conceal from them, at the behest of Anglo-American imperialism, their fascist interior, their sinister designs against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

The recent Budapest and Sofia trials of the imperialist agents Rajk and Kostov demonstrated to the whole world how the Belgrade adventurers made the peoples of Yugoslavia pass under the yoke of Wall Street and the City, converting that country into a nest of spies, a centre of fascist imperialist aggression in the Balkans.

During the years of the great war of liberation against hitlerite tyranny the wonderful people of Yugoslavia won the admiration of all progressive humanity. Today this people has been torn by a despicable band of traitors employing terrorism and violence from the midst of the family of fraternal peoples that compose the democratic camp and have closely rallied around the great Soviet Union.

Invincible, however, are the forces of the peoples that have embarked upon the road of Socialism, nor can there be any doubt

that all the evil designs of the imperialists and their Yugoslav lackeys are bound to end in a fiasco.

Almost throughout its socialist history the people of the Soviet Union has had to withstand singlehanded the robber forces of imperialist reaction, which tried to turn back the wheel of history, to restore by force of arms, bribery and espionage the erstwhile empire of the Russian tsars, and seat once more the landlord and the capitalist upon the necks of our working folk.

After the Second World War the peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe, which had been delivered by the Soviet troops under the supreme command of Generalissimo Stalin from Nazi slavery, received the opportunity to shape their own destinies. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania, who have now adopted the course of building Socialism, in a short period of time have achieved very tangible results in the development of both a new, People's Democracy and a socialist system of economy.

Socialist industry and agriculture, economics as a whole, as well as culture in these countries, have made rapid strides during the

brief postwar span, despite the furious opposition and the open and concealed interference of the foreign and domestic capitalist reactionaries. The unselfish fraternal assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to these countries and the constant attention and sincere solicitude of the great Stalin for their welfare testify to the strong, indissoluble and effective bonds of friendship that exist between the U.S.S.R. and the peoples of the new democracies. When the war was over the front of the fighters for peace grew in strength and width and became impregnable.

Besides the thriving, prospering Mongolian People's Republic the camp of the fighters for peace and democracy in the East has been enlarged by the addition of the peoples which have cast off the chains of semicolonial slavery, the chains of imperialist and feudal oppression, namely, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, the biggest country in the world.

The predictions made by the great Stalin almost a quarter of a century ago concerning the forces of the revolutionary movement in China have been fully borne out by the realities of life.

The world is witnessing the materialization of what was foreseen by the genius of the great Stalin, the triumph of the Lenin-Stalin theory of the national-colonial revolution.

The Soviet Union's victories over Hitler Germany and imperialist Japan in the Second World War were the paramount prerequisites of the world-historic victory of the Chinese people in their war of national liberation.

The great Chinese people, having thrown into the dustbin of history the anti-popular venal clique of Chiang Kai-shek together with his Anglo-American masters, has now firmly taken the road of the democratic transformation of its sovereign state, the road of struggle for peace, independence and friendship among the peace-loving countries.

The front of the fighters for peace, pitted against the front of the warmongers, has grown today into a vast, indomitable force.

We, the people of the Soviet Union, have every reason to take pride in the fact that the great Stalin, the Party of Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Government and our socialist country as a whole, together with the People's Democracies and free China, are a powerful force working in opposition to the aggressive plans

of the incendiaries of a new world war. We are proud of the postwar foreign policy of the great Stalin, the Soviet Government and the People's Democracies, a policy directed toward the strengthening of the equality of peoples and the respecting of their sovereignty, and against the threat of new wars and new pretenders to world dominion. The Soviet people, together with all other upright people in the world—and they number hundreds of millions—are waging and will continue to wage the struggle for the consolidation of democracy and the extirpation of the remnants of fascism that have not been finished off, that are coming to life again and are being revived apace by the imperialists—the struggle for a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, for a lasting peace and democracy all over the world.

* * *

The great and historic victory of the Land of Socialism over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan, the victory won by the Soviet people under the guidance of the great Party of Lenin and Stalin led by the genius of

Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, brought huge losses to the system of world capitalism and helped hundreds of millions of people to throw off the yoke of the old world.

There has grown up a mighty front of peace, democracy and Socialism, uniting around the Soviet Union the free peoples in a friendly, brotherly and democratic family.

Blinded by savage class hatred Anglo-American imperialism, powerless to stop the inevitable course of history, openly threatens the free peoples with a new world war. But times have changed, the balance of real forces has changed.

Socialism has become the principle of life of many countries and peoples, the camp of the fighters for peace has grown into a gigantic force.

The mighty voice of great Stalin in defence of peace throughout the world has penetrated to every corner of the globe, it has penetrated to the soul and heart of the working people, of the progressive men and women of the whole world. They, the simple, honest people, know that every word of the great Stalin is a tocsin calling for vigilance and

effective opposition against the instigators of a new world war, and, in answer to Stalin's call they are forming in powerful columns of fighters for peace, for freedom and the happiness of mankind.

Glory to the wise and brilliant leader and teacher of working and progressive mankind!

May he live for many long and glorious years to the happiness and triumph of the working people of the whole world, this wonderful man, the great friend of all the progressive people of the world—Stalin!

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